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A Fresh Look at a Stale Doctrine: How Public 
Policy and the Tenets of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil Dictate the Inapplicability of the 




¶1 The Reconstruction period immediately following the Civil War was a trying time 
for our nation.  The Confederate states paid a price for their secession, largely in lost 
political power.  They were forced to submit to the will of the Union on issues such as the 
adoption of the Civil War Amendments.  The white people of the South struggled to 
maintain their way of life; many joined the Ku Klux Klan, which used violent tactics to 
repress the newly freed slaves.1  In response to this threat, Congress passed the Ku Klux 
Klan Act, also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the 1871 Act).  The 1871 Act 
aimed to thwart those who would deprive former slaves of their newly created federal 
rights.2 
¶2 Section 2 of the 1871 Act comprised two provisions, one creating criminal 
penalties and the other establishing civil remedies for conspiracies to deprive others of 
their rights.  In 1883, the Supreme Court struck down the criminal provision of section 2, 
holding it unconstitutional as applied to private entities3 (where state action is not 
alleged) because “the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide [Congress with] authority 
to proscribe exclusively private conspiracies.”4  After this decision, the civil conspiracy 
provision of the 1871 Act “lay dormant for [70 years] since people simply assumed it was 
unconstitutional as well.”5  The civil provision was revived in 1971, however, when the 
Supreme Court held private conspiracies actionable if they are motivated by a “class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”6  A swarm of litigation followed, in which 
plaintiffs sought damages under the civil conspiracy section7 for injuries arising from 
                                                 
* Special thanks to Professor Len Rubinowitz for his encouragement and guidance. 
1 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 425 (1988). 
2 See Harrison v. KVAT Food Mgmt., 766 F.2d 155, 157-58 (4th Cir. 1985); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
398 U.S. 144, 164 (1970). 
3 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1883). 
4 United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). 
5 Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
981, 1017-18 (2002). 
6 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). 
7 This section is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985.  See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
442 U.S. 366, 370 (1979). 
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rights deprivations by purely private entities.  Many of the defendants in these cases were 
corporations.8 
¶3 Most of the cases against corporate defendants could have been dismissed due to a 
lack of state action because the 1871 Act does not cover wholly private conspiracies.9  
Despite this avenue for dismissal, a large number of cases were disposed of by resorting 
to a policy only recently introduced to civil rights law: the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine.  The doctrine holds that agents and employees of a corporation are acting on its 
behalf when engaging in business decisions; thus, since a conspiracy requires “a meeting 
of the minds,”10 and since the acts of the separate people are attributed to the single 
corporate entity, there is but a single legal actor.11  No conspiracy can exist. 
¶4 The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was originally used in the field of antitrust 
law to shield a corporation from liability for its agents and officers “conspiring” to fix 
prices under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.12  In a seminal antitrust case, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that since the agents all work for the same entity, 
they could hardly be accused of conspiring for debating their own pricing policy.  
Addressing the need for open policy discussions within corporate bodies, the court 
created the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine by holding that the agents and officers of a 
corporation cannot be said to conspire under section 1 of the Sherman Act.13  While the 
court never used the term “intracorporate,” it recognized that a basic requirement in 
conspiracy law is “two [or more] persons or entities” and that “[a] corporation cannot 
conspire with itself any more than a private individual can.”14  The intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine’s extension to the civil rights context has been heavily criticized in 
law review literature15 because, when applied to agents of municipal entities, the doctrine 
immunizes such agents from liability for discriminatory conspiracies aimed at depriving 
others of their constitutional rights.16 
¶5 Little attention, however, has been paid to the culprit behind the doctrine: the 
corporate entity itself.17  This artificial “person” serves an important purpose: it allows us 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1976); Doherty v. Am. Motors 
Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1984); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 505 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1974). 
9 There is a caveat to this: wholly private conduct is covered, but only when the deprived rights are 
protected against private infringement.  See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.  However, this 
caveat almost never applies to corporations because a corporation would never realistically seek to deprive 
people of those few rights protected against private infringement, such as the right to be free from “the 
badges and incidents of slavery” and the right to interstate travel.  Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06. 
10 Ameen v. Merck & Co., 226 Fed. App’x 363, 371 (2007). 
11 See Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952). 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Geoff Lundeen Carter, Agreements Within Government Entities and Conspiracies Under 
Section 1985(3) - A New Exception to the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1139 
(1996) (arguing that the legislative history of the 1871 Act dictates the doctrine’s inapplicability to  
§ 1985(3)); Catherine E. Smith, (Un)Masking Race-Based Intracorporate Conspiracies Under the Ku Klux 
Klan Act, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129 (2004) (arguing that the text of the 1871 Act includes conspiracies 
by agents of both private and municipal corporations). 
16 See Rebel Van Lines v. Compton, 663 F. Supp. 786, 793-94 (C.D. Cal. 1987). 
17 It has been mentioned before briefly.  See Cole v. Univ. of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 893 (D. Conn. 
1975); Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c): The Impact of Novotny v. Great 
American Federal Savings & Loan Association, 13 GA. L. REV. 591, 616-17 (1979). 
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to attribute the actions of the officers and agents of a corporation to the single corporate 
entity.18  The corporate entity also enables the bedrock principle of corporate law: limited 
liability.19 
¶6 In the early days of corporate law, a common law doctrine evolved to combat abuse 
of the corporate entity.  This doctrine allowed plaintiffs to hold shareholders directly 
liable for the actions of the corporation where it was shown that the corporate entity was 
used for unjust ends.  Since it directs courts to disregard the corporate entity, legal 
scholars have long referred to the doctrine as “piercing the corporate veil.”20 
¶7 This Comment contends that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should never 
have been applied in the civil rights arena in light of the tenets of the veil-piercing 
doctrine, which holds that the corporate entity should be disregarded when it is abused or 
asserted for unjust ends.21  Consequently, this Comment argues that no justification exists 
for extending the doctrine to agents of municipal corporate entities, who were, in fact, 
one of the intended targets of the 1871 Act.  In most civil rights cases where the 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is now applied, the municipal corporate entity is 
asserted to shield its agents from liability for alleged conspiracies aimed at depriving 
plaintiffs of their rights.22  The entity is thus asserted for the unjust end of negating 
liability before a court can even hear the facts of a case.  The veil-piercing doctrine 
should negate the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine with regard to civil rights claims 
because Congress never intended to allow an intracorporate exception to the 1871 Act.23 
¶8 Part II of this Comment examines the history of civil rights conspiracy law, 
including the impetus for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and the case law that has 
engendered this imbroglio.24  Part III outlines the concept of the artificial corporate 
entity.25  Part IV describes the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, beginning with its 
origins in antitrust law and continuing to its improper application to corporations under 
civil rights conspiracy claims.26  Part IV then notes the doctrine’s exceptions and 
subsequent extension to municipal corporate entities.27  Lastly, Part IV discusses a trend 
among the district courts of applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.28  Part V explains the doctrine known as “piercing the corporate 
                                                 
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).  This is a basic principle of agency law.  The acts of 
the agent bind the entity so that the principal may be liable for an agent’s unlawful act.  Id. 
19 See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
20 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41 (perm. 
ed., rev. vol. 1999).  See infra Part V. 
21 See infra Part V. 
22 See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 474 F. Supp. 848, 875 (D. Conn. 1979), aff’d, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1985); Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); 
Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509-10 (6th Cir. 1991); Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1508-09 (7th Cir. 1994); Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 
347, 354 (8th Cir. 1985); Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 768-70 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Gladden v. Barry, 558 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D.D.C. 1983); Shaw v. Klinkhamer, No. 03-6748, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14483 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005); see also infra Part VI.A.2 (discussing Dickerson and Shaw in 
depth). 
23 See infra Part VI.A.1. 
24 See infra Part II. 
25 See infra Part III. 
26 See infra Part IV.A & B. 
27 See infra Part IV.C & D. 
28 See infra Part IV.E. 
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veil” and analyzes its general premise: disregarding the corporate entity in order to 
uphold public policy and achieve justice.29  Part VI then notes the dissonance between 
the veil-piercing doctrine and the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and argues that 
Congress did not contemplate the latter in passing the 1871 Act because such an 
exception would negate its purpose.30  Finally, Part VI suggests that the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine is inconsistent with civil rights law and ends by proposing a limited 
standard by which courts might apply the intracorporate exception in civil rights cases to 
ensure that its reach is not broader than Congress intended.31 
II.  THE HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY LAW 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1871 
1. Reconstruction and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan 
¶9 In the South, the end of the Civil War gave rise to an equally tumultuous era, 
especially for former slaves.32  While many white Southerners were willing to 
acquiesce33 to the passage of the Thirteenth,34 Fourteenth35 and Fifteenth Amendments,36 
they were determined “to define in their own way the meaning of freedom.”37 
¶10 In 1866, six white men established the Ku Klux Klan (Klan); although its founders 
claimed the group was for their own amusement and “purely social,”38 it became much 
more.  The Klan transitioned “from pranks to systematic brutality by 1867 [and] members 
routinely resorted to violence.”39  While it had no organized structure, the Klan and 
kindred organizations were “deeply entrenched in nearly every Southern State” by 
1870.40  As the Klan’s message of white supremacy spread across the South, its 
membership escalated to immense proportions.41 
                                                 
29 See infra Part V. 
30 See infra Part VI.A. 
31 See infra Part VI.B & C. 
32 FONER, supra note 1, at 119-23. 
33 Id. at 189. 
34 The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
35 The Fourteenth Amendment furthered many objectives; section 1 is arguably the most important and 
most litigated law in the nation’s history.  Sanford Levinson, Why It’s Smart to Think About Constitutional 
Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 364 (2000).  Section 1 extended the Due Process clause to 
individual state action and prohibited states from passing or enforcing laws that (1) “abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens,” or (2) “deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is important to our discussion 
because it gave Congress the power to enforce the Amendment through appropriate legislation.  Id. § 5. 
36 The Fifteenth Amendment granted suffrage to all males regardless of “race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
37 FONER, supra note 1, at 120.  Foner quotes a Freedman’s Bureau agent: “‘Southern whites . . . are quite 
indignant if they are not treated with the same deference that they were accustomed to’ under slavery.”  Id.  
While white Southerners accepted the federal government’s decrees of new rights for former slaves, they 
actively sought to thwart and deny these rights, ensuring that non-whites were treated as second-class 
citizens.  Id. at 429-30. 
38 WYN CRAIG WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE KU KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 31-34 (1987).  The original 
members maintained that the Klan was created merely “to have fun, make mischief, and play pranks on the 
public.”  Id. 
39 SALLY HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE CAROLINAS 207 (2001). 
40 See FONER, supra note 1, at 425. 
41 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951) (noting the Reconstruction-era Klan had a membership 
of roughly 550,000, which, at the time, included nearly all Southern white males). 
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2. The Klan’s Terrorist Tactics 
¶11 The Klan became one of the nation’s earliest terrorist groups42 by engaging in 
brutal acts of violence in order to intimidate its victims into submission.43  Ruling by 
fear, the Klan assaulted and murdered blacks and anyone who supported their freedom;44 
the Klan ultimately “aimed to regulate blacks’ ‘status in society.’”45  Despite the patent 
illegality of their actions, Klan members were rarely subject to criminal prosecution.46  
Not only was the public unwilling to cooperate with authorities, but local authorities were 
often members of the Klan themselves.47  Given this backdrop of lawlessness, Congress 
decided to take action.48 
3. Congress Seeks to Limit the Klan’s Effectiveness 
¶12 In response to the Klan’s riotous tactics, Congress passed the 1871 Act, commonly 
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.49  Section 1 of the 1871 Act is now codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 198350 and section 2 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985.51  Section 2 created 
criminal penalties and provided civil remedies against conspiracies to: (1) prevent public 
officials from performing their duties; (2) obstruct justice; or (3) deprive “any person or 
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws.”52 
                                                 
42 SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, KU KLUX KLAN: A HISTORY OF RACISM AND VIOLENCE 6 (5th ed. 
1997). 
43 See FONER, supra note 1, at 426 (noting that the Klan “aimed to . . . restore racial subordination in every 
aspect of Southern life”). 
44 Id. at 428.  Some acts included the assault of a crippled Northerner who taught blacks, the lynching of an 
Irish teacher from a black school (along with four black men), and the murder of a freedman for his size 
and ability to read and write.  Id. 
45 Id. at 430.  The violence was most commonly directed at blacks who refused to adhere to the social caste 
formerly assigned to them as slaves.  For example, “victims included blacks accused of speaking 
disrespectfully to whites, [or those] who did not yield the sidewalk to white passersby.”  Id. 
46 See id. at 434-35. 
47 Id. 
48 While Congress sought to help those attacked by the Klan and to end the Klan’s reign of terror, the 
passage of the 1871 Act could not have been entirely altruistic.  A primary purpose of the 1871 Act was to 
prevent “[c]onspiracies to deprive citizens of the right to vote.”  See FONER, supra note 1, at 454; see infra 
notes 170-172 and accompanying text.  Citizens who were typically attacked by the Klan and denied their 
voting rights included blacks and their white sympathizers—both of whom were loyal to the Republican 
Party, which held the majority in Congress at the time.  See The Ku-Klux Bill, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Apr. 15, 
1871, at 330. 
49 Civil Rights Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-1986 
(2000)). 
50 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 164 (1970).  Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person within 
the jurisdiction of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
51 Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. 366, 370 (1979). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2000).  The most widely used provision of § 1985—subsection 3—provides that if 
two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws 
[and] if one or more of the persons engaged [in the conspiracy] do, or cause to be done, any act 
in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured . . . or deprived of 
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured 
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B. Judicial Decisions Limiting the Scope of the 1871 Act 
¶13 The 1871 Act did not go unchallenged for long.  In 1883, the Supreme Court struck 
down the criminal provisions, holding them unconstitutional in United States v. Harris.53  
After conceding that Congress had the authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
through appropriate legislation, the Court held that Congress exceeded its authority in 
proscribing private conspiracies since the Fourteenth Amendment protects only against 
state action.54  While the civil provision remained, it fell into virtual disuse because it, 
too, was presumed to be constitutionally deficient.55  Thus, the Supreme Court did not 
hear a case arising under the civil provision until 1951.  There, the Court expressly held 
that successful claims under § 1985 require a showing of state action.56  The civil 
provision was thereafter considered devoid of practical purpose because “few if any 
plaintiffs can allege or prove [a state action] causal chain.”57 
C. Griffin v. Breckenridge and § 1985’s Applicability to Private Conspiracies 
¶14 In 1971, the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge revived civil rights conspiracy 
jurisprudence when it broadly declared private conspiracies actionable.  When presented 
with Griffin’s facts, the Court found Collins v. Hardyman unduly restrictive58 because 
some federal rights are protected from private infringement. 
¶15 The plaintiffs in Griffin—black citizens—were driving along the highway in 
Mississippi when they were stopped by the white defendants, who assaulted the plaintiffs, 
held them at gunpoint and threatened to kill them.59  The plaintiffs sued, claiming the 
defendants deprived them of the right to be free from “the badges and incidents of 
slavery” and of the right to interstate travel.60  Believing this was just the type of conduct 
the 1871 Act intended to prohibit, the Court overruled Collins and held that § 1985(3) can 
reach private action.61  However, to allay fears that it would be interpreted “as a general 
                                                                                                                                                 
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . against any one or more of the 
conspirators. 
Id. 
53 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637-38 (1883). 
54 Id. at 637-39.  The Court reinforced this holding in 1887.  Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 689-90 
(1887). 
55 Beermann, supra note 5, at 1017-18. 
56 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 655 (1951). 
57 Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1356 
(1952).  This limited interpretation would not have allowed claims against members of the Klan for their 
riotous conspiratorial tactics, which were often effectuated without state involvement.  See FONER, supra 
note 1, at 430 (noting the Klan engaged in vigilante justice).  Thus, one of the original purposes of the 
statute was frustrated.  However, the other purpose of preventing those with state authority from abusing 
their power was still valid.  In Part VI, I argue that the statute also targeted Klan members and sympathizers 
who held state office and used their authority to deprive blacks of their federal rights.  See infra Part 
VI.A.1.  Today, the majority of defendants in § 1985(3) claims are agents and officers of state entities in 
employment discrimination cases.  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 22. 
58 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1971). 
59 Id. at 90-91. 
60 Id. at 105-06. 
61 Id. at 95-96.  The Court stated that to recover under § 1985: 
[A] complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) “conspire . . .” (2) “for the 
purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.”  It must then assert that one 
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federal tort law,” the Court held that the section’s use of the term “equal protection” 
requires that the conspiracy be motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”62 
¶16 In concluding that the private conduct was actionable, the Court noted that the 
plaintiffs’ deprived rights—the right to be free from the “badges and incidents of slavery” 
and the right to interstate travel—are protected against private infringement as a 
“privilege[] of national citizenship” and by the Thirteenth Amendment, respectively.63  
Thus, while the Court stated that its inquiry must simply identify “a source of 
congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged by the complaint,”64 it did 
not expressly hold that the deprived rights’ protection against private infringement is 
essential for recovery.  Thus, Griffin incorrectly led many to believe that § 1985 covered 
all forms of purely private conduct.65  After Griffin, numerous lawsuits were brought 
against corporations under § 1985 in which no state action was alleged.  While these 
cases had no merit and should have been dismissed for want of state action, inventive 
lawyers successfully asserted intracorporate immunity instead.66 
D. Later Judicial Decisions Limiting the Scope of § 1985: Novotny, Scott, and Bray 
Provide Clarification 
¶17 While Griffin expanded § 1985 to include private conduct, the Court gradually 
limited the section’s scope over the next few decades.  After Griffin, the Court considered 
§ 1985 in a 1979 case where the plaintiff claimed to have been deprived of rights created 
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).67  Here, the Court held that  
§ 1985 could not be used to vindicate rights found in Title VII, for allowing plaintiffs to 
do so would alter the “short and precise time limitations of Title VII.”68  This might 
                                                                                                                                                 
or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, “any act in furtherance of the 
object of [the] conspiracy,” whereby another was (4a) “injured in his person or 
property” or (4b) “deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen 
of the United States.” 
Id. at 102-03. 
62 Id. at 102. 
63 Id. at 105-06. 
64 Id. at 104. 
65 See, e.g., Eggleston v. Prince Edward Volunteer Rescue Squad, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1344, 1352 (E.D. Va. 
1983) (noting, in a suit against a private corporate defendant, that state action is not necessary to state a 
claim under § 1985).  As will be shown, however, § 1985 protects against private conduct only when the 
deprived rights are so protected.  See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
66 See cases cited supra note 8. 
67 Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979).  The plaintiff alleged that his 
termination was due to his opposition to the Association’s unspoken policy of subverting the opportunities 
of female employees.  Id. at 368-369.  In this case, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of 
whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine extends to § 1985.  Id. (stating “[for] the purposes of this 
question, we assume but certainly do not decide that the directors of a single corporation can form a 
conspiracy within the meaning of § 1985(3)”). 
68 Id. at 375-76.  The Court noted that § 1985 “provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a 
remedy for violation of the rights it designates.”  Id. at 372.  The majority reserved judgment on whether 
the deprived rights must stem from the Constitution.  Id. at 370 n.6.  Since this issue is not resolved and is 
beyond the scope of this discussion, this Comment assumes that rights claimed to be deprived under § 1985 
can only be found in the Constitution. 
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allow plaintiffs to “completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a 
crucial role in the scheme established by Congress.”69 
¶18 In 1983, the Court considered the section’s applicability to a conspiracy by union 
members to deprive non-members of their freedom of association.70  The Court held such 
a conspiracy is not actionable under § 1985 because a deprivation of First Amendment 
rights can only be accomplished through state action.71  This holding demonstrates that  
§ 1985 was never meant to reach all forms of private conspiracy.  Recovery under the 
section for private conspiracies depends on the nature of the underlying deprived rights: 
if the right is constitutionally protected from infringement by private actors, then the 
private conspiracy is actionable.72  If the right is only protected against state 
infringement, such as the freedoms of speech and religion or equal protection rights, then 
private conspiracies are not actionable since Congress lacks the authority to pass such 
broad legislation.73  Section 1985’s basis in the Fourteenth Amendment74 supports the 
notion that the conduct it covers is generally state-sponsored.75  This state action 
requirement allows us to frame the dispute; this Comment argues against applying the 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to claims under § 1985 and to conspiracy claims under 
§ 1983.76  Claims under § 1983 require action “under color of [law],”77 while claims 
under § 1985, as we have just seen, require state action unless the underlying deprived 
right is protected against private conduct.  In passing the 1871 Act, Congress aimed to 
prevent the Klan’s conspiratorial deprivations in any way possible.  In Part VI, I argue 
that one of the Klan’s most effective tactics was using the power of the state to deprive 
freedmen of their rights by obstruction of justice or simple inaction by Klan members and 
sympathizers who held state office; thus, applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 
                                                 
69 Id. at 376.  This was a sound decision given the detailed system Congress established to handle Title VII 
claims.  Allowing such claims under § 1985 would obfuscate the distinctions between the statutes, making 
it difficult for lower courts to correctly apply the law.  See id. at 373-75 (noting the distinctions). 
70 United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983).  In Scott, the plaintiffs—non-
union workers—were assaulted and beaten by a group of union workers over their non-union status.  Id. at 
827-28. 
71 Id. at 830 (stating “an alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment [or equal protection] rights is not a 
violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is involved” or affected). 
72 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).  For example, the Klan’s violence towards blacks 
who refused to adhere to their former subordinate caste would be actionable because the blacks’ right to be 
free from the badges of slavery is protected from private action under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Id. at 
105; see supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
74 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973) (noting that “the primary purpose of the 1871 
Act was ‘to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment’” (quoting the title of the 1871 Act 
itself)). 
75 Id. (noting that “the Fourteenth Amendment itself ‘erects no shield against merely private conduct, 
however discriminatory or wrongful’” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948))). 
76 While the term conspiracy is not in the text of § 1983 and proving a conspiracy is not required under  
§ 1983 as it is with § 1985, courts have recognized § 1983 conspiracy claims as a “legal mechanism 
through which to impose liability on each and all of the [d]efendants without regard to the person doing the 
particular act.”  Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 126 (5th Cir. 1963).  To prove a conspiracy claim under  
§ 1983, plaintiffs “must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action and (2) a 
deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  Pfannstiel v. Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 
(5th Cir. 1990).  See supra note 50 for the text of section 1983. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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in cases under these sections will prevent claims Congress intended to permit against 
defendants who conspired to abuse their state power.78 
¶19 The Court affirmed this interpretation of the section’s coverage in its most recent  
§ 1985 case.79  The plaintiffs in that case were abortion clinics and “organizations that 
support legalized abortion,” who sued to enjoin the defendants—members of Operation 
Rescue who organized antiabortion protests—from “trespass[ing] on, and obstruct[ing] 
general access to, the premises of abortion clinics.”80  While the claim failed for lack of 
state action,81 the Court held that “women seeking abortion” are not a protected class 
under § 1985.82  Before discussing the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, it is prudent to 
summarize the doctrine’s basis: the nature of the corporate entity. 
III. THE ARTIFICIAL CORPORATE ENTITY: THE ENTITY AS A “PERSON” 
¶20 The traditional theory of corporate law holds “that a corporation is a fictitious, 
artificial, legal person or juristic entity created by proper authority.”83  This statement 
should be broken down for the sake of understanding. 
¶21 For the basics of corporate personality, I rely on Arthur Machen’s 1911 article of 
the same name84 because it is one of the earliest “influential” treatises arguing that 
corporate entities are real and not fictions.85  The first premise of corporate personality is 
“that a corporation is an entity distinct from the sum of the members that compose it.”86  
The second premise is “that this entity is a person.”87  Machen, however, concludes that 
“the essence of juristic personality does not lie in the possession of rights but in 
subjection to liabilities.”88  This is true because the law can only enforce or protect rights 
                                                 
78 FONER, supra note 1, at 434-35 (stating “Much Klan activity took place in those Democratic counties 
where local officials either belonged to the organization or refused to take action against it”); see infra Part 
VI.A.1. 
79 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993). 
80 Id. at 266. 
81 Id. at 278 (noting that the right to an abortion is not protected against private infringement). 
82 Id. at 269.  The Scott Court was unsure if any class other than “Negroes and those who championed their 
cause” would qualify as protected.  United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 
(1983) (noting “it is a close question”).  Despite the Court’s uncertainty, however, lower courts have 
extended protection to race, gender, “religion, ethnicity [and] political loyalty.”  Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 
1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988). 
83 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 78 (3d ed. 1983).  The act of incorporation was 
originally understood as a privilege granted by the government.  See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 
17 U.S. 518, 637-38 (1819).  In discussing this point, Chief Justice Marshall noted that “[t]he objects for 
which a corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote.”  Id. at 637.  The 
Chief Justice might be surprised to find that the corporate entity may now be used to shield from liability 
those who conspire to deprive others of their civil rights. 
84 Arthur Machen Jr., Corporate Personality (I), 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911). 
85 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 
173, 220 (1986).  Also, Machen was an accomplished corporate law professor who published a widely cited 
treatise on the subject in 1908.  Alfred F. Conrad, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review 
of William W. Cook’s Publications on Corporations, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1733 n.61 (1995). 
86 Machen, supra note 84, at 258.  This premise is basic to modern corporate law.  Id. at 259.  The 
corporation, therefore, functions as a distinct legal entity under the law, with its own rights and 
responsibilities apart from those of the employees and officers who are essential to its existence. 
87 Id. at 258. 
88 Id. at 263-64 (noting “Those beings are ‘persons’ in law to whom the law both can and does address its 
commands. . . . The essential prerogative of man does not lie in rights, but in duties.  Every system of law, 
from the Decalogue down, is founded upon thou-shalt-not’s, addressed to beings capable of understanding 
the command, of feeling the penalty, and of exercising a will to act accordingly.”). 
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by punishing the “person” who violates those rights—“an idle proceeding unless the 
violator is a moral being capable of being deterred by the threat of punishment.”89 
¶22 For this reason, Machen argues that society regards the corporate entity “as having 
rights and liabilities for the sake of convenience; but . . . men of flesh and blood [must] 
bear the burdens attributed by the law to the corporate entity.”90  Thus, Machen 
concludes that corporate personhood—the idea of the corporation as comparable to a real 
person—“is either a mere metaphor or is a fiction of law.”91  Machen later notes that this 
“fiction” of corporate personhood also applies to the state as a municipal corporation.92 
¶23 It is important, then, to distinguish between the corporate entity and the corporate 
“person”—the former being real, while the latter is “fictitious” or, more aptly, artificial.93  
There is a danger, however, in writing off the corporate entity as a mere fiction because it 
serves the essential purpose of separating the corporate investors from their investment.94  
This separateness allows the doctrine of limited liability—the fundamental principle of 
modern corporate law95—to protect investors from the corporation’s liabilities.96  In the 
case of municipal corporations, the entity allows states to act on its citizens’ behalf by 
isolating and delegating state functions to the appropriate departments and agencies.  In 
addition, the municipal entity is currently used to immunize conspirators from liability 
for civil rights deprivations. 
IV. THE INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
A. The Origins of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine 
¶24 The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine emerged in 1952 in Nelson Radio & Supply 
Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,97 a case brought under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.98  
                                                 
89 Id.  Thus, “the law can speak only to the human beings who compose [the corporation] or who manage 
and control its destinies.”  Id. at 265. 
90 Id. at 266.  This emphasizes the importance of looking to the acts of individual corporate agents rather 
than the corporate entity. 
91 Id. 
92 Arthur Machen Jr., Corporate Personality (II), 24 HARV. L. REV. 347, 348 (1911). 
93 The corporate entity is real in that it exists.  However, a corporation cannot exist as a real person because 
it lacks the independent will of human beings, the only natural legal entities.  Thus, the corporate entity is 
artificial because, while it exists, it is a man-made conception that lacks the inherent traits of human beings. 
94 For this reason, I do not refer to corporate or municipal entities as “fictions.”  When using the word 
fiction, it becomes too easy to write off the entity as non-existent.  But it is beyond dispute that the entity 
exists.  Instead, I refer to these entities as “artificial” for the reasons noted supra note 93.  However, it is 
clear that many scholars refer to the corporate entity as a fiction; in deference to their expertise, I will not 
alter their terminology of choice. 
95 See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 574-75 (1986).  
Due to its enabling power of amassing vast amounts of wealth while limiting investors’ risk, limited 
liability has been labeled “the greatest single discovery of modern times.”  Quoted by I. MAURICE 
WORMSER, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction—When and Why, in DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE 
FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS 1, 2 (1927) (noting “even steam and electricity are far less 
important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative impotence 
without it”). 
96 The principle of limited liability restricts an investor’s liability to the amount invested in the corporation. 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 
89-90 (1985) (stating “no one risks more than he invests”).  Investors can thus contribute capital to 
corporations assured that their personal assets will not be lost if the corporation becomes insolvent or 
suffers an adverse civil judgment. 
97 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952). 
98 Section 1 outlaws “every contract combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
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The complaint alleged that Motorola coerced the plaintiff into an exclusive franchise 
agreement by which the plaintiff could no longer sell products made by Motorola’s 
competitors.99  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there could be no conspiracy 
because the defendant was a corporation and could only act through its agents (whose 
acts are attributed to the corporation itself).100 
¶25 The Supreme Court endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s Nelson Radio holding in 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., noting that an internal agreement among 
firm members to implement the firm’s policy “does not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 
was designed to police.”101  The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is thus settled law in 
the antitrust field.  However, this holding does not implicate the doctrine’s applicability 
to civil rights cases because it was limited to section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Even by 
analogy, this holding cannot affect the doctrine’s applicability to civil rights cases 
because agreements among municipal agents to deprive citizens of their legal rights were, 
I argue, exactly the type of “dangers that [the 1871 Act] was designed to police.”102 
B. Advent of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine in Civil Rights Claims Against 
Corporate Employees 
¶26 Dombrowski v. Dowling introduced the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to the 
civil rights arena.103  Dombrowski was a white criminal lawyer who sought to rent office 
space from the corporate defendant and its agent, Jack Dowling.  According to 
Dombrowski, when Dowling learned that “a substantial number of [Dombrowski’s] 
clients were of the Black race or of Latin origin,” Dowling ended the negotiations and 
refused to rent the office to Dombrowski.104  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held private 
conspiracies are not actionable under § 1985 if the underlying right stems from section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment because that section only protects against state action.105  
The court continued, however, noting in dicta that the existence of a conspiracy cannot be 
“satisfied by proof that a discriminatory business decision reflects the collective 
judgment of two or more executives of the same firm.”106 
                                                                                                                                                 
restraint of trade of commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)). 
99 Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 912. 
100 Id. at 914.  This assumes the agents acted in their official capacity.  Id.  The court framed the claim as 
alleging that the “defendant [corporation], through its officers and agents, conspired with itself to restrain 
trade.”  Id.  The problem in civil rights conspiracies is that a municipal entity’s agents are the sole 
conspirators, yet the entity shields them from liability. 
101 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (stating “officers or employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of 
actors imperative for a § 1 conspiracy”). 
102 Id.; see infra Part VI.A.1. 
103 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). 
104 Id. at 191. 
105 Id. at 196 (holding “the right secured by the Equal Protection clause . . . is a right to protection against 
unequal treatment by a state”); see supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. 
106 Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196.  The court further noted that if the act “is essentially a single act of 
discrimination by a single business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the decision . . . 
will normally not constitute the conspiracy contemplated by” § 1985.  Id.  Some district courts have 
characterized this as a rationale for the doctrine, holding the doctrine “was created to shield corporations 
and their employees from conspiracy liability for routine, collaborative business decisions that are later 
alleged to be discriminatory.”  Newsome v. James, No. 96-7680, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5678, at *46 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 25, 2000).  Courts of Appeals justify the doctrine more vaguely, holding that corporate agents 
jointly pursuing a corporation’s “lawful business do not become ‘conspirators’ when acts within the scope 
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¶27 Many courts found this language irresistible.  Over the next decade, the majority of 
§ 1985 lawsuits that complained of conduct by purely private actors107 were promptly 
dismissed under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.108  The circuits are now split on 
whether the doctrine should be applied to civil rights cases: the majority of circuits—the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh—have applied the doctrine, 
whereas the First and Third Circuits have rejected it.109  The Supreme Court has not yet 
resolved the split.110  In side-stepping the doctrine, the First and Third Circuits factually 
distinguished their cases from those of the majority, paving the way for other courts—
even courts in the majority—to find exceptions to the doctrine in the civil rights context. 
C. Exceptions to the Rule 
¶28 Many courts have been reluctant to uphold the doctrine in circumstances that call to 
mind Congress’s intent in passing the 1871 Act.  Their reluctance derives from the 
indiscriminate reach of the intracorporate exception to civil conspiracies.  The doctrine 
broadly dismisses lawsuits even in cases where such dismissal contradicts the intentions 
of the 1871 Act.  As a result, courts have created exceptions to the doctrine where justice 
requires. 
¶29 One exception to the doctrine originated from the “single act of discrimination” 
dictum in Dombrowski.111  Courts applying this exception have found that a series of acts 
or instances of discrimination can negate the doctrine because the existence of persistent, 
recurring discrimination is strong evidence that the defendants conspired.112  Courts also 
allow an exception where the conduct alleged is criminal because the “fiction of [the] 
corporate entity [has] never been applied as a shield against criminal prosecutions.”113 
¶30 Another exception arose in cases where plaintiffs alleged police misconduct.114  
This exception may stem from Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases in which the court 
found police officers liable for conspiracy without ever mentioning the intracorporate 
                                                                                                                                                 
of their employment are said to be discriminatory or retaliatory.”  Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 
Inc., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). 
107 See cases cited supra note 8. 
108 See, e.g., Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1976) (having just dismissed 
the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for lacking the requisite state involvement, the court engaged in a full analysis 
of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and dismissed the § 1985(3) claim on that basis); Baker v. Stuart 
Broad. Co., 505 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1974) (despite citing Dombrowski, the court—in a two-page 
opinion—dismissed a § 1985(3) claim against a private corporation under the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine without discussing the state action requirement). 
109 Hoefer v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057-58 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating “[the] Second, 
Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have followed the Seventh Circuit’s extension of the doctrine to § 1985 
[whereas] the First and Third Circuits have refused to apply” the doctrine to §1985); see also Hilliard v. 
Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 768-70 
(11th Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue.  Hoefer, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 
(citing Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 910 (9th Cir.1993)). 
110 See supra note 67 and infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
111 Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196. 
112 See Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1984); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
584 F.2d 1235, 1259 n.125 (3d Cir. 1978); Rackin v. Univ. of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
113 United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 971-72 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Wise, 370 
U.S. 405, 417 (1962) (Harlan, J. concurring)). 
114 See Schmittling v. City of Belleville, No. 05-572, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28594, at *12 (S.D. Ill. May 
10, 2006) (listing cases in Seventh Circuit district courts). 
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conspiracy doctrine.115  The exception—limited to police officers—is based on the idea 
that police misconduct is an abuse of power that occurs outside the scope of 
employment.116  This is an extension of the argument that the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine is meant to shield corporate employees for “routine, collaborative business 
decisions.”117  Where courts find a police action causing a plaintiff’s injury was not 
routine, the action is held to be outside the scope of employment and, thus, within a 
doctrinal exception, rendering the plaintiff’s claim actionable.118 
¶31 Some courts have found doctrinal immunity by holding the wrongful act outside 
the scope of employment when personal reasons motivated the agents.  One such 
exception occurs when the agents have “an independent personal stake in achieving” the 
illicit objective.119  This exception stems from dicta in Nelson Radio, where the court 
noted the plaintiff did not allege that the agents “were actuated by any motives personal 
to themselves.”120  The court intimated that if the plaintiff had joined the alleged 
conspirators as defendants in the lawsuit and alleged that those defendants did not act 
“only for the defendant corporation,” it might have ruled otherwise.121 
¶32 In Hartman v. Board of Trustees of Community College District Number 508, the 
plaintiff asserted that the doctrine did not apply because the conspirators acted with 
“personal racial animus” and, therefore, had independent stakes in the conspiracy’s 
objective.122  The court noted the similarity between “personal racial animus,” the 
“independent personal stake” exception, and the “invidiously discriminatory animus” 
required in Griffin.123  The Hartman court found that allowing a “personal racial animus” 
to negate the doctrine would permit the exception to swallow the rule; thus, the court 
concluded that the “personal stake” exception applies only where the agents acted solely 
because of personal bias or motive.124  Other courts have similarly limited the 
exception.125 
D. Extension to Municipal Corporate Entities 
¶33 By the mid-1980s, many courts extended the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to 
cover the acts of agents of municipal entities.  The extension was prompted by the 
similarities between public and private educational institutions.  In Cole v. University of 
Hartford, a Connecticut district court found that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 
applied to agents of a private university, shielding them from liability.126  A year later, a 
                                                 
115 Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992-94 (7th Cir. 1988); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 
1253-64 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). 
116 Schmittling, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28594, at *14. 
117 Newsome v. James, No. 96-7680, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5678, at *46 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2000). 
118 Schmittling, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28594, at *14. 
119 Greenville Publ’g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974). 
120 Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952).  A similar exception 
applies where conspirators act “on their own behalf.”  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 
U.S. 752, 769 n.15 (1984). 
121 Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914. 
122 4 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 1993). 
123 Id. at 470. 
124 Id. 
125 Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1994); Salgado v. City of N.Y., No.  
00-3667, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3196, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2001). 
126 391 F. Supp. 888, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1975); accord Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 
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Louisiana district court, citing Cole, extended the doctrine in a case against the 
University of New Orleans.127  Within a few years, a Connecticut district court extended 
the doctrine to agents of the state’s university.128  By the mid-1980s, district courts 
regularly applied the doctrine to bar § 1985 claims against agents of public entities.129 
¶34 In 1991, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard a § 1985 case against members of 
a board of education.130  Citing its own precedent and the Second Circuit’s application of 
the doctrine to “an educational corporation” in Herrmann v. Moore,131 the court found 
that the doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim.132  Soon after, the Supreme Court denied the 
plaintiff’s petition for certiorari on the issue of the doctrine’s applicability to § 1985(3) 
claims.133 
¶35 Finally, in 1994, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which introduced the 
doctrine to the civil rights arena, held explicitly that the doctrine applies to municipal 
agencies.134  Such agencies, the court noted, “are functionally the equivalent of 
corporations in that their employees and officers jointly endeavor to provide a product or 
service and reach decisions pursuant to a unified, hierarchical structure.”135  In Part VI, I 
argue that Congress’s intent in passing the 1871 Act was to put a stop to all rights 
deprivations and that the intended targets of the Act therefore included not only Klan 
members acting as private citizens but also agents of municipal entities, who are in a 
unique position to deprive others of their rights due to the state power they wield.  Thus, 
if municipal agencies are indistinguishable from corporate entities based on hierarchical 
structures and joint endeavors, any argument that would negate the doctrine’s 
applicability to agents and officers of corporate defendants in the civil rights arena would 
surely negate its applicability to agents of municipal entities.136 
E. Extension to § 1983 Conspiracies 
¶36 A number of district courts have extended the doctrine to negate conspiracy claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.137  The trend is unsettling because the purpose of § 1983 is to 
                                                                                                                                                 
1978) (holding that agents of a private law school were shielded from liability). 
127 Chambliss v. Foote, 421 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D. La. 1976) (stating: “the university and its officials are 
considered as constituting a single legal entity which cannot conspire with itself”), aff’d, 562 F.2d 1015 
(5th Cir. 1977).  The university is public and was established by the Louisiana legislature in 1956.  
University of New Orleans History, http://www.uno.edu/history.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
128 Lieberman v. Gant, 474 F. Supp. 848, 875 (D. Conn. 1979), aff’d, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating 
“the present defendants were all acting in their capacities as [agents] of the University of Connecticut at the 
time of the alleged conspiracy”) (citing Cole, 391 F. Supp. 888). 
129 See, e.g., Zentgraf v. Tex. A & M Univ., 492 F. Supp. 265, 272-73 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Gladden v. Barry, 
558 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing Herrmann, 576 F.2d 453). 
130 Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991). 
131 Doherty v. Am. Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1984); Herrmann, 576 F.2d at 459. 
132 Hull, 926 F.2d at 510. 
133 Hull v. Schuck, 510 U.S. 1261 (1991).  Justices White and Marshall strongly felt the Court needed to 
resolve the issue; both dissented to the denial of certiorari.  Id. 
134 Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1508 (7th Cir. 1994). 
135 Id. 
136 See infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text. 
137 See, e.g., Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 419 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604-605 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Jackson v. 
N.Y. State, 381 F. Supp. 2d 80, 90 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Shaw v. Klinkhamer, No. 03-6748, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14483 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005); Tabor v. City of Chi., 10 F. Supp. 2d 988, 993-94 (N.D. Ill. 1998); 
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 1366, 1382 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 
 144
Vol. 3:1] Barry Horwitz 
curb abuses of power perpetrated by those with state authority.138  Section 1983 
conspiracy claims cover a broader scope of conduct than those under § 1985 because 
plaintiffs need not establish class-based discrimination.139  Extending the doctrine to  
§ 1983 thus allows those with state power to freely conspire to deprive others of their 
rights.  Disturbingly, courts may have extended the doctrine in this way due to a simple 
typographical error. 
¶37 Several district courts have stated that, in Buschi v. Kirven,140 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied the doctrine to bar a § 1983 conspiracy claim.141  Though the 
Fourth Circuit examined the doctrine’s applicability in Buschi, it did so while explaining 
the court’s holding below, in which the district court dismissed specific defendants from 
the lawsuit.142  In its analysis, the court stated that another case “held that ‘unauthorized 
acts [of employees] in furtherance of a conspiracy may state a claim under § 
1983(3).’”143  This is clearly incorrect because § 1983(3) does not exist: § 1983 has no 
sub-sections.144  The court must have intended to write “§ 1985(3)” as that is the only 
section that expressly involves civil rights conspiracies.  A cursory glance at the quoted 
case verifies that the error is indeed typographical.145  Even so, § 1983 conspiracy claims 
may now be barred by the doctrine.  While it may seem logical to extend the doctrine 
from  
§ 1985 to § 1983 given that both sections originated in the 1871 Act, I argue that the 
doctrine should generally not apply to claims under either section.  I turn now to the 
                                                 
138 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972) (stating “Section 1983 opened the federal courts to 
private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state 
law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation”); see also J. Harry Blackmun, Section 
1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive Or Fade Away?, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1985) (noting that § 1983 today is meant “to protect the rights of those without 
power against oppression at the hands of the powerful”). 
139 See supra note 76 for the elements of a § 1983 conspiracy claim. 
140 775 F.2d 1240 (4th Cir. 1985). 
141 Anemone, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 604 n.2; Doe, 833 F. Supp. at 1382; Culver v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., No. 
5:04-CV-389, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45426, at *18 (E.D.N.C. June 26, 2005); Lopez v. Maczko, No. 07-
1382, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 63416, at *19 n.11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2007). 
142 Id. at 1248-54.  In this discussion, the court noted that the plaintiffs asserted the conspiracy claim under 
§ 1985, alleging that some defendants had independent personal stakes in the conspiracy.  Id. at 1253.  The 
court later engages in a full-scale discussion of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as applied to § 1985.  
Id. at 1257-59.  The first two counts, which alleged First Amendment retaliation and a due process 
deprivation, respectively, were the only claims that could have been asserted under § 1983.  Id. at 1242-43.  
However, the court never mentioned the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine when it addressed these claims.  
Id. at 1247-48, 1254-57. 
143 Id. at 1252-53 (misquoting Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Md. 1978)). 
144 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
145 Hodgin, 447 F. Supp. at 807 (stating “unauthorized acts in furtherance of a conspiracy may state a claim 
under § 1985(3)”) (second emphasis added).  The Buschi court repeats the error later in the opinion when it 
notes that a commentator recently suggested that “the Supreme Court [in Scott] . . . intimated that the 
section [1983(3)] reaches only conspiracies motivated by racial bias.”  Buschi, 775 F.2d at 1258 n.10 
(misquoting Brian J. Gai, Section 1985(2) Clause One and Its Scope, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 756, 764 
(1985)).  In fact, the Buschi court incorrectly cited this article as Volume 170 of the Cornell Law Review, 
which will not exist until 2085.  Id.  Thus, while the Buschi court never actually discussed the doctrine as it 
relates to § 1983, the Buschi opinion is thus rife with typographical errors that could result in the drastic 
effect of barring § 1983 conspiracy claims against agents of a single entity.  But see Kivanc v. Ramsey, 407 
F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 n.4 (D.D.C 2006) (noting without reason that no Court of Appeals has applied the 
doctrine to § 1983 conspiracy claims). 
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piercing the corporate veil doctrine to assess its congruence with the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine. 
V. THE TENETS OF THE PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL DOCTRINE 
¶38 The concept of shielding constituents behind their shared entity is not unique to the 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.  Limited liability is the basis of the corporate form; it 
allows us to conduct business effectively in the modern world.  While incorporating “for 
the purpose of achieving limited liability” is permitted,146 shareholders can abuse the 
corporate form and hide behind the corporate liability shield where, for example, they use 
the corporation for illegitimate purposes.147  In such cases, courts will disregard the 
corporate entity—and, thus, the notion of limited liability—in the name of equity.  In 
deference to the idea of disregarding the artificial corporate entity, legal scholars have 
long referred to this doctrine as “piercing the corporate veil.”148 
¶39 The doctrine is problematic, however, because limited liability is the “traditional 
cornerstone” of corporate law.149  Courts are reluctant to pierce the veil because doing so 
forces a shareholder to suffer a liability greater than his or her original investment.  
Despite this reluctance, courts have held that piercing is appropriate in “egregious 
circumstances.”150  However, between courts’ difficulty discerning such circumstances 
and their reluctance to enforce liabilities beyond a shareholder’s original investment, the 
veil-piercing doctrine has been applied inconsistently.151  However, the general concept 
of the doctrine—the disregard of the corporate entity—is entirely consistent with its 
premise: to uphold considerations of public policy and equity against the liability shield 
provided by the artificial corporate entity. 
¶40 The general rule of the doctrine can be found in United States v. Milwaukee 
Refrigerator Transit Co., where the court held: 
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule . . . 
but when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, 
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the 
corporation as an association of persons.152
¶41 One treatise explains that the veil should be pierced where the corporate form is 
“used to accomplish an improper or unlawful purpose.”153  Further, the veil is commonly 
                                                 
146 HENN, supra note 83, § 146. 
147 Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1351-52 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the piercing of the veil 
where “the corporation was an artifice and a sham designed to execute illegitimate purposes” because “the 
level of capitalization of the corporation was sufficiently low to constitute fraud”). 
148 FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 41. 
149 Blumberg, supra note 95, at 574. 
150 See, e.g., C. F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight, Ltd. P’ship, 338 F.3d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 2003). 
151 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 96, at 89 n.1 (stating “hundreds of decisions . . . are irreconcilable 
and not entirely comprehensible”).  The doctrine has been called a “legal quagmire” due to the 
overwhelming number of conflicting cases.  Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REV. 12, 15 (1925). 
152 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (emphasis added). 
153 FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 41.10; see HENN, supra note 83, § 146 (noting “the test is simply whether or 
not recognition of corporateness would produce unjust or undesirable consequences inconsistent with the 
purpose of the concept”). 
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pierced to prevent “the unjust raising of a defense.”154  Finally, when individuals use the 
corporate entity “to shield personal wrongdoings, the court must look to substance rather 
than to form.”155  Given this background in the veil-piercing doctrine, I now examine 
how the doctrines conflict. 
VI. WHEN DOCTRINES COLLIDE: THE VEIL-PIERCING DOCTRINE NEGATES THE 
INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ARENA BECAUSE THE 
LATTER CONTRAVENES CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND CURRENT CIVIL RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Intent of Congress in Passing the 1871 Act is Negated by Applying the 
Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine 
1. Intracorporate Conspiracies and Piercing the Veil: Public Policy and the Purposive 
Intent of the 1871 Act 
¶42 The general public policy of the United States is set by Congress through its power 
to legislate.156  In 1871, Congress decided that civil conspiracies to deprive another of her 
rights are against public policy; the 1871 Act thus provided a remedy to victims of such 
conspiracies.157  Conspiracies actuated through state action are now covered by §§ 1983 
and 1985. 
¶43 In a classic veil-piercing case, then-Judge Cardozo wrote: “The logical consistency 
of a juridical conception will indeed be sacrificed” when necessary to uphold or defend 
an accepted public policy.158  In the civil rights field, the rights of individuals have been 
sacrificed to uphold the notion that agents of a principal corporate entity cannot 
conspire.159  This trend thwarts Congress’s intent in passing the 1871 Act. 
¶44 In drafting the 1871 Act, Congress sought to enforce the Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,160 the fundamental principle of which 
was to guard against abuses of state power.161  The state can only act through its human 
agents,162 who are subject to the same whims and biases as all humans.  Thus, these 
clauses afford protection against the reality that agents of the state will, at times, use state 
                                                 
154 FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 41.20.  Fletcher later notes that “[where] the corporate form is . . . asserted 
in an attempt to evade a statute,” the veil is likely to be pierced.  Id. § 41.34. 
155 Id.; accord Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass’n, 247 U.S. 
490, 501 (1918) (holding that where the corporate entity is being abused as a shield, “the courts will not 
permit themselves to be blinded or deceived by mere forms [of] law but, regardless of fictions, will deal 
with the substance . . . as if the corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may require”); 
In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 F. 609, 613 (S.D. Ohio 1907) (holding the “corporate entity is not so 
sacred that a court of equity, looking through forms to the substance of things, may not . . . ignore it to 
preserve the rights of innocent parties”). 
156 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983) (stating “[t]he contours of public policy 
should be determined by Congress, not by judges”). 
157 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
158 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 95 (1926).  Judge Cardozo used as an example cases “where 
the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary [corporations] will work a fraud upon the law.”  Id. 
(citing Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 247 U.S. 490). 
159 See, e.g., infra Part VI.A.2.a (discussing Dickerson) and Part VI.A.2.b (discussing Shaw). 
160 See supra notes 35 and 74. 
161 Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).  The Equal Protection 
clause was meant to prevent discrimination, an abuse of the government’s power to classify.  See Louisville 
& Nashville R.R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U.S. 36, 52 (1910). 
162 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
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authority to further personal biases—whether against a class of people or a single 
individual.  When such a biased decision is jointly made with the intention of depriving a 
person of her constitutional rights, the 1871 Act provides a remedy.163  While the 
conspiracy sections of the 1871 Act were partially intended to restrain the private conduct 
of those who would deny blacks their rights to life, liberty and property,164 I believe the 
provisions were also meant to curb conspiratorial abuses of power by state actors who 
sympathized with the Klan’s ideology.165 
¶45 There is little debate that the Klan’s purposes were almost entirely political.166  
“[President] Grant wrote that the Klan aimed ‘by force and terror to prevent all political 
action not in accord with the view of the members[ and] to deprive colored citizens of the 
right to bear arms and of the right to a free ballot.’”167  Thus, in the Klan’s view, the 
newly freed slaves did not deserve the rights bestowed upon them by the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.168 
¶46 Given this belief, Klan members and sympathizers169 sought to deny blacks the 
rights enjoyed by whites.170  A former member admitted that the Klan hoped to “gain[] 
control of the outcome of elections.”171  The group’s political objectives were clear: 
amass state and federal power in Klan members and sympathizers, who would use 
government power to restore white supremacy.172 
¶47 Klan members and sympathizers violated the Fourteenth Amendment by infiltrating 
the government to instill their unconstitutional racism into state agendas.  More 
importantly, local government infiltrators who sympathized with the Klan—such as 
judges, sheriffs, and police deputies—could readily deny others their rights, such as the 
right to a fair trial, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the 
right to bear arms.173  Where multiple sympathizers or members worked on behalf of one 
                                                 
163 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
165 These days, however, discrimination is less conspicuous; it usually occurs in the context of employees’ 
rights.  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 22.  The fact that the deprived rights are economic in nature does 
not imply that the deprivation is less compelling or less worthy of remedy than the 1871 Act intended.  See 
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (holding that the right to property, though 
economic in nature, is a basic civil right Congress recognized in passing the 1871 Act).  There are non-
economic harms associated with civil rights violations, such as humiliation and mental anguish.  See Sasaki 
v. Class, 92 F.3d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1996). 
166 Herbert Shapiro, The Ku Klux Klan During Reconstruction: The South Carolina Episode, 49 J. OF 
NEGRO HISTORY 34, 43 (1964). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 44 (stating “The Klan avowed its respect for the United States Constitution, but only for that 
version in effect before 1865”). 
169 Throughout this section, I use the term “Klan sympathizer” to indicate any post-Civil War white 
Southerner who believed that whites and blacks were inherently unequal and that the subjugation of blacks 
was the natural order. 
170 One of the Klan’s methods in reaching this goal was to suppress black suffrage through terror and 
intimidation.  Shapiro, supra note 166, at 44. 
171 Id. 
172 As a corollary to this, the Klan also sought to keep out of power those who supported the Negro cause.  
In one town in South Carolina, the only black magistrate was murdered.  Id. at 41.  A white judge in the 
same town was assaulted “because he was supposed to have advocated social equality between the races.”  
Id.  Suppressing black suffrage similarly furthered the goal of centralizing power in the hands of those who 
opposed black equality.  Id. 
173 Indeed, once a Klan member or sympathizer gained a position in local government, he could embark on 
a reign of political terror. 
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state entity, their mutual plans to deprive others of their federal rights on account of race 
or party affiliation were undeniably contrary to the Equal Protection clause.  Therefore, 
Congress enacted section 2 of the 1871 Act to both protect Klan victims from violence 
and provide a remedy for victims of unconstitutional rights deprivations achieved through 
conspiracies by agents of state entities. 
¶48 State infiltration by members or supporters of the Klan is not as far-fetched as it 
may seem.  Reconstruction-era South Carolina provides a prime example of state 
infiltration by Klan members.  In one county, the “chief of the Klan [was a] member of 
the Legislature.”174  Others identified as active Klan members included the county sheriff 
and a former magistrate.175  Among those with substantial state power—and a kind ear 
bent toward Klan objectives—were “several of the key leaders of the [South Carolina] 
Democratic party [who] refused to use their influence to suppress the violence.”176  This 
may explain why the state government’s response “to the resurgence of the Klan in 1870-
71 was largely one of inaction and vacillation.”177  The Klan’s goals and methods were 
no different in other Southern states.178 
¶49 Besides its obvious aim of preventing the Klan’s private conspiracies, the 1871 Act 
sought to limit joint abuses of power by those with state authority.  The plain language of 
the 1871 Act supports this interpretation: under § 1985, the only express civil rights 
conspiracy section, conspiracy victims may sue “any one or more of the conspirators”—
no exceptions are listed. 179 
¶50 As one writer noted before the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was commonly 
extended to agents of state entities, “When state officials are involved, the conspiracy 
necessarily will affect the ability or willingness of the authorities to accord equal 
protection of the laws.”180  Thus, the commentator concluded, in cases “involving state 
officials as conspirators, [section 1985] is little different from section 1983.”181  This 
view accords with the canon of construction in pari materia, which provides that §§ 1983 
and 1985 should be interpreted similarly.182 
¶51 In addition, the legislative history of the 1871 Act evinces Congress’s concern that 
“state instrumentalities could not protect [federally created] rights” and “that state 
                                                 
174 Id. at 50. 
175 Id. at 50-51. 
176 Id. at 52. 
177 Id. at 44. 
178 See FONER, supra note 1, at 433 (stating that notable Klan members included a one-time North Carolina 
legislator and “Georgia’s Democratic candidate for governor in 1868”).  Foner also notes that the governor 
of North Carolina “offer[ed] tacit approval to Klan activities” and that throughout the South, “prominent 
Democrats either minimized the Klan’s activities or offered thinly disguised rationalizations for them, 
[while some] denied the organization’s existence altogether.”  Id. at 434.  While it cannot be proved that all 
these politicians were members of the Klan, those who minimized or rationalized the Klan’s brutal acts of 
violence were likely Klan sympathizers who sought to benefit from the “potent appeal of white 
supremacy,” id. at 441, and who would therefore seek to deny blacks their rights. 
179 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2000) (emphasis added).  The lack of exceptions connotes that Congress likely did 
not consider granting conspiratorial immunity to intracorporate agents—especially agents of state entities. 
180 Mark Fockele, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
402, 437 (1979). 
181 Id. 
182 Bramwell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 348 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2003).  If we interpret the two sections 
similarly, then the proper defendants under § 1985 would generally be agents of the state; in such a case, 
the fact that the agents work for the same state entity is entirely irrelevant, except that their shared principal 
facilitated the rights deprivation.  See supra notes 50 and 52 for the text of §§ 1983 and 1985. 
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officers might [be unsympathetic] to the vindication of those rights.”183  Representative 
Stevenson of Ohio noted the common belief that Klan members used their political 
influence to infiltrate state governments as “officers of the law.”184  Further, Ohio 
Representative Perry “referred to state authorities [acting] ‘in complicity with’ the 
conspirators.”185  While no one can know the extent to which the secrecy-driven Klan 
infiltrated state governments, we know Congress was aware of and sought to remedy 
conspiratorial deprivations of rights caused by state actors when passing the 1871 Act.  
Thus, in the case of civil rights conspiracies, the liability shield provided by the 
municipal entity should be sacrificed to uphold the wishes of Congress. 
¶52 Furthermore, courts should not be reluctant to “pierce the corporate veil” in such 
cases because doing so would not require courts to expose shareholders to liability 
beyond their original investment.  Since the defendants in §§ 1983 and 1985 conspiracy 
cases are agents of municipal corporate entities, the concept of limited liability does not 
apply.186  Thus, courts are not forced to repudiate the most basic doctrine of corporate 
law in refusing to acknowledge the municipal corporate veil.187  As such, the corporate 
law considerations that made courts reluctant to disregard the corporate entity simply do 
not apply to civil rights conspiracies perpetrated through municipal corporations. 
¶53 It is again worthwhile to note that civil rights conspiracy litigation was virtually 
non-existent until 1971, when the Supreme Court extended § 1985(3) to private action.188  
However, due to the misconception that § 1985 covered all types of private conspiratorial 
deprivations rather than just those protected against private infringement, there were 
numerous suits brought against corporate defendants in which the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine was used to preclude liability.189  By the mid-1980s, courts extended 
                                                 
183 Blackmun, supra note 138, at 6.  Ohio Representative (later President) Garfield complained that while 
the laws were “just and equal on their face,” states still deprived blacks of rights through “systematic 
maladministration of [the laws], or a neglect or refusal to enforce the[m].”  Fockele, supra note 180, at 416 
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 153, col. 3 (1871)). 
184 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 286, col. 1 (further stating: “Were all the Ku Klux arrested 
and brought to trial, among them would be found sheriffs, magistrates, jurors, and legislators, and it may be 
[sic] clerks and judges”)). 
185 Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 79, col. 3).  This language was copied into the 
1871 Act itself.  In section 4, Congress gave the President broad powers to use military force to quell 
insurrections where a state is overthrown or “the constituted authorities are in complicity with, or shall 
connive at the unlawful purposes of [the unlawful conspiracies of section 2].”  Section 4 of the Civil Rights 
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
186 Adams v. Brickell Townhouse, 388 So. 2d 1279, 1280 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1980) (noting that a “purpose 
of the corporate fiction is to insulate stockholders from liability for corporate acts,” but not officers or 
agents).  The conspirators, but not the municipal corporate entity, would be liable for the injuries brought 
about by the conspiracy.  See infra notes 266-270 and accompanying text. 
187 John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporate 
Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445, 447 (noting that the notion of 
piercing the corporate veil might be more apt “when the principle of limited liability is not directly 
implicated”); see also WORMSER, supra note 95, at 10 (quoting Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of England: 
“[it] is a certain rule . . . that a fiction of law shall never be contradicted so as to defeat the end for which it 
was invented, but for every other purpose it may be contradicted”). 
188 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
189 See cases cited supra note 8.  The intracorporate exception would never have been extended to 
municipal agents in civil rights conspiracy claims if these cases against private corporations had been 
properly dismissed due to a lack of state action. 
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the doctrine to municipal corporations without fully considering the implications of 
precluding liability for state actors engaged in conspiracies to abuse their power.190 
¶54 Veil-piercing does not apply to municipal entities because they have no 
stockholders upon whom to impose liability.  But the tenets of the veil-piercing doctrine 
should have been considered when private corporate agents asserted that their 
conspiratorial liability was precluded by the existence of the corporate entity.191  Since 
recognizing the corporate entity for that purpose would allow an unjust result—
immunizing from liability agents who conspire to deprive people of their rights—courts 
should have pierced the veil and disregarded the entity to reach the facts behind the rights 
deprivation.  Municipal corporate agents with state authority are better able to deprive 
people of rights than private corporate agents, so the unjust result borders on the absurd.  
By applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in the field of civil rights, courts 
effectively immunized the 1871 Act’s most pertinent contemporary conspiracy 
defendants based on adventitious precedent.192 
¶55 In Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc., the court upheld the 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine by asserting that in 1871, “it was understood that 
corporate employees acting to pursue the business of the firm could not be treated as 
conspirators.”193   To support this claim, the court cited Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward194 and Fletcher’s Law of Corporations.195  Neither of these sources, however, 
asserts anything of this nature.196  In fact, Fletcher notes that corporations may be liable 
for civil conspiracy where agents conspire to “commit wrongs against another for the 
benefit of the corporation.”197  Further, in the past, judges and commentators were 
hesitant to support the asserting of the corporate form as a defense.198  Machen noted the 
“unfortunate tendency to regard the corporate fiction as a touchstone to be applied to all 
questions connected with corporations.”199 
                                                 
190 See Michael Finch, Governmental Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: A Theory Reconsidered, 57 
MONT. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (1996) (noting that “in early conspiracy cases filed under section 1983 [where state 
action is required], intracorporate immunity was rarely mentioned.  Instead, immunity doctrine appears to 
have entered into the law of governmental conspiracy through precedent under section 1985(3), almost all 
of which was forged in private sector litigation.  Thus, [the municipal intracorporate conspiracy doctrine] is 
adventitious, or at best an unexamined by-product of precedent.”). 
191 Before transplanting the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine into the civil rights arena, courts should have 
looked to other corporate law doctrines to ensure that extending the doctrine to civil rights conspiracies 
would be consistent with both civil rights and corporate law. 
192 Finch, supra note 190, at 37-38. 
193 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). 
194 17 U.S. 518, 637-38 (1819). 
195 FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 4884. 
196 In Woodward, the Court merely discussed the properties of the corporate entity and how it simplifies the 
complex intricacies of transmitting property between members of the corporation.  Woodward, 17 U.S. at 
636. 
197 FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 4884.  Agents do not enjoy limited liability.  See supra note 186.  Thus, the 
agents would be equally liable. 
198 First Nat’l Bank v. F.C. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 326 (1898) (noting that the artificial corporate 
entity is applied so often as “to induce the belief that it must be universal, and be in all cases adhered to, 
although the greatest frauds may thereby be perpetrated under the fiction as a shield”); see also WORMSER, 
supra note 95, at 10 (stating that the fiction must be applied with common sense “to promote the ends of 
justice. . . . There is always danger, when a fiction . . . becomes so deeply rooted in the case law, that 
judges no longer remember its [purpose] and apply the fiction to an extent where they [no longer] penetrate 
into the actual facts behind it.”). 
199 Machen, supra note 92, at 357.  Machen concluded: “[the] subtlety of this temptation ought to serve as a 
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¶56 The Travis court then addressed Dombrowski’s dictum200 that the “Klan could not 
avoid liability by incorporating . . . because the Klan meddled in the business of 
others.”201  This very statement militates against applying the doctrine.  The court 
reasoned that by incorporating, the Klan would still attempt to achieve its aims through 
“multiple centers of social or economic influence.”202  However, the court overlooked 
that the Klan’s paramount objectives were political203 and that it therefore sought to 
achieve its goals through infiltrating governments.204  Indeed, the Klan attempted to 
meddle in the business of the state in order to achieve its goal of restoring white 
supremacy.  Today, government officers meddle in state affairs when they wield their 
state authority in conspiring to deprive others—typically their subordinate employees—
of their rights.205  It is fortunate that the modern version of the 1871 Act exists to remedy 
such abuses of authority. 
¶57 After holding that the doctrine barred a plaintiff’s claim, one court suggested that 
the plaintiff “can still assert direct Section 1983 claims against [every agent] who 
participated in the deprivation in his or her individual capacity.”206  The court did not 
substantiate this proposition, however, because it is shortsighted.  The purpose of 
conspiratorial liability in tort law is to expand both the scope of defendants and the scope 
of conduct by “rendering liable those persons who support [or formulate] unlawful 
conduct, but do not play an active role in its accomplishment.”207  Thus, conspiratorial 
liability allows plaintiffs to sue defendants who actively achieve the rights deprivations 
and all those who either supported or devised the deprivation because the act of 
conspiring is thought to be “a special evil to society” and, as such, deserves special 
recognition.208 
¶58 One commentator argues that the doctrine should apply if the agents’ actions “are 
traditionally attributed to the entity.”209  The consequences of such a proposal are 
                                                                                                                                                 
warning against this dangerous error of overestimating the importance . . . of the conception of a 
corporation as a legal entity or person, and of treating this doctrine as the decisive point in many cases with 
which it really has nothing to do.”  Id. at 358 (emphasis added). 
200 See infra notes 273-274 and accompanying text. 
201 Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 921 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). 
202 Id. 
203 See supra notes 166-167 and 170-172 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 78, 174-178, and 183-185 and accompanying text. 
205 Defendants in contemporary civil rights conspiracy cases often abuse their authority because the 
plaintiff threatens their positions of power.  In the examples in Part VI.A.2, infra, the defendants conspired 
to harm the plaintiffs because the latter’s knowledge of the former’s improprieties placed the former in 
jeopardy.  See infra notes 216 and 231 and accompanying text. 
206 Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 419 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
207 Finch, supra note 190, at 5; Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 62 (1994) (noting the purpose “of 
a conspiracy claim is to extend liability in tort beyond the active wrongdoer to those who have merely 
planned, assisted or encouraged [his] acts”) (citation omitted).  Expanding liability to other defendants 
helps plaintiffs when some defendants may be insolvent. 
208 Comment, Reason by Analogy: Agency Principles Justify Conspirators’ Liability, 12 STAN. L. REV. 476, 
482 (1960); see Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c), 92 HARV. L. REV. 470, 478-
79 (1978) (noting the traditional rationale for conspiracy liability is the presence of a special danger when 
“collective activity [is undertaken] for unlawful purposes” because of “the opportunity for deliberate 
plotting, efficient execution through separation of functions, mutual moral support, and generation of 
inertia decreasing the likelihood that any single participant will be able to prevent achievement of the group 
goal” (citations omitted)). 
209 Douglas G. Smith, The Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): The Original 
Intent, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1152 (1996). 
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disturbing.  Not only does it turn a blind eye to the abuse of state power, it negates 
Congress’s intent to ensure that state actors comply with the Equal Protection Clause.  
The question cannot fall upon the traditional attributions of the act because the act 
furthering the conspiracy cannot be achieved without abusing state power.210  The rule 
that should govern in these cases was well stated by the Supreme Court in United States. 
v. Classic: “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with [state] authority . . . is action taken ‘under color 
of’” state law.211  The question is whether the municipal agents’ acts should be attributed 
to their principal entity; the determination should be based on the factors taken into 
account when the decision to act was made.212  The illustrative cases below exemplify the 
conspiracies Congress intended to remedy with the 1871 Act. 
2. Cases Where the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine’s Application Negated 
Congressional Intent 
i) Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission 
¶59 A perfect example of how the doctrine is used unjustly to shield conspirators from 
§ 1985 liability arises in Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission.213  In March 1994, 
Alfred Dickerson, an African-American corrections officer at the county jail, was on-duty 
shift supervisor when a prisoner’s escape was discovered; it is undisputed that the escape 
actually occurred the previous night, when Dickerson was not on duty.214  Charles King, 
William Krider, and Gary Brown began an investigation.215  According to Dickerson, 
“conflicts of interest should have precluded [King and Krider] from participating in the 
investigation [since] Krider knew about [the] escape plan in advance and failed to file an 
incident report.”216  Despite the officers’ dubious motives, they found that the jail broke a 
rule about the “posting [of] uncertified officers alone in housing units where inmates are 
confined.”217  However, the report “only cited the jail for violations of the rule that 
occurred during Shift I—the shift supervised by Dickerson—not during Shift III, when 
                                                 
210 Tabor v. Chicago, 10 F. Supp. 2d 988, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that “[w]here the defendants’ ability 
to injure a plaintiff derives solely from their positions within the entity for which they work, and the 
influence they wield therefrom, the [intracorporate conspiracy] doctrine” applies); accord Williams v. 
Cook County, No. 05-6351, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44443, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2006) (noting “if [the 
defendants] were not acting within the scope of their authority as Cook County employees, they could not 
have ‘harmed’ [the Plaintiff] as she alleges”). 
211 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (emphasis added) (holding defendants guilty under what is now 18 U.S.C.  
§ 241, section 1985’s sister criminal provision, of conspiring to deprive citizens of their constitutional right 
to vote). 
212 See FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 4884 (noting “[the] test of the corporation’s liability in conspiracy cases 
is whether there was authority for doing the act in question by its officer or agent, and, if so, whether the 
agent acted for the master”) (emphasis added).  If the agent did not act for the master, the corporation is not 
liable.  However, this does not negate the agent’s liability.  See infra notes 257-258 and accompanying text. 
213 200 F.3d 761(11th Cir. 2000). 
214 Id. at 763. 
215 Id. at 764. 
216 Id.  Dickerson’s knowledge that the employees were aware of the escape plan and did nothing to stop it 
jeopardized those employees’ jobs.  Thus, they likely conspired to shift the blame to Dickerson in order to 
save their jobs. 
217 Id. 
 153
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  L A W  A N D  S O C I A L  PO L I C Y  [ 2 0 0 8  
 
the escape actually occurred.”218  The investigation found no violations before or during 
the escape and concluded that Dickerson and his minority subordinates were entirely at 
fault.219  He and three subordinates were demoted promptly; the white officers on duty at 
the time of the escape “received only written warnings.”220 
¶60 Dickerson sued, alleging that “Caucasian jail officers and managers, including 
Brown, King and Krider” conspired to blame him and his minority subordinates for the 
escape, which in fact occurred because of the negligence of the alleged conspirators.221  
A jury found the defendants liable under § 1985 for conspiring to deprive the plaintiff of 
due process and equal protection and awarded Dickerson $50,000; the Eleventh Circuit 
vacated the judgment, however, holding that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 
precluded the § 1985 conspiracy claim.222  The court reasoned that since Dickerson failed 
to include any defendants who were not county employees, all the defendants were acting 
under a single legal entity and were thus incapable of conspiring.223 
¶61 The court also found that the doctrine’s exceptions were inapplicable.224  Despite 
the fact that the investigating officers had “independent personal stakes” in shifting the 
responsibility from themselves to Dickerson and his subordinates, the court noted without 
explanation that this exception did not apply.225  Thus, the doctrine barred a claim 
Congress intended to permit. 
ii) Shaw v. Klinkhamer 
¶62 Shaw v. Klinkhamer illustrates how the doctrine can be used to unjustly shield 
conspirators from liability in conspiracy claims under § 1983.226  In 1991, Susan 
Klinkhamer, mayor of St. Charles, Illinois, appointed Donald Shaw to chief of police; as 
chief, Shaw worked under Klinkhamer and her aide, Maholland.227 
¶63 In the summer of 2002, one of Klinkhamer’s major campaign donors received a 
speeding citation.228  When she heard of the citation, Klinkhamer called Shaw, “telling 
him that she ‘didn’t like it’ and that she wanted him to ‘pull it.’”229  After the citation was 
nullified without the issuing officer’s permission, Shaw launched an investigation of the 
                                                 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id.  It seems that once Dickerson constituted a threat to King, Krider, and Brown, these officers infused 
racism into their decision.  Dickerson alone may not have been enough to prove that racism was a factor, 
but the fact that Dickerson and “[three] other African-American officers who worked on [his] shift,” were 
the only ones demoted, while the white officers at fault received only a slap on the wrist, implies that 
racism was a substantial factor in the decision.  Id. 
221 Id. at 763-64. 
222 Id. at 765-70. 
223 Id. at 768. 
224 Id. at 769-70.  The exception for criminal action did not apply “because Dickerson [did] not allege any 
criminal conduct or that the conduct here could give rise to criminal charges.”  Id. at 770; see supra note 
113 and accompanying text. 
225 Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 768; see supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
226 No. 03-6748, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14483 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2005). 
227 Id. at *3. 
228 Id. 
229 Id.  “Klinkhamer also informed Shaw that she was displeased with a liquor compliance investigation 
involving [McNally’s Pub], whose officers and part-owners had given Klinkhamer’s re-election campaign 
its largest cash donation in 2001.  After McNally’s received its punishment, Shaw notified Maholland of 
what he perceived to be ‘extreme favoritism.’”  Id. at *4. 
 154
Vol. 3:1] Barry Horwitz 
unauthorized disposition of the citation on January 8, 2003.230  He informed the state 
police of his suspicions on February 3, requesting an official inquiry and later disclosed 
that he suspected political influence.231  By February 18, Maholland informed Shaw that 
he would not be reappointed.”232   
¶64 Shaw brought a conspiracy claim under § 1983, alleging that Maholland and 
Klinkhamer conspired not to reappoint him “in retaliation for Shaw’s having launched an 
investigation into the resolution of the [campaign donor’s] traffic citation and having 
reported perceived acts of favoritism.”233  The court held that Shaw’s claim failed 
because it was not clear that the “decision not to reappoint Shaw was [made] solely for 
personal reasons.”234  Again, the doctrine barred a claim Congress intended to allow. 
3. A Notable Case Where Applying the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine Would 
Negate Congressional Intent 
¶65 In recent times, the most notable case to evoke application of the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine is Wilson v. Libby, Rove & Cheney.235  On July 6, 2003, Joseph 
Wilson IV, a former ambassador, published an op-ed in the New York Times236 in which 
he refuted President Bush’s primary rationale for invading Iraq.237  Wilson went to Niger 
on behalf of the CIA to investigate the rationale and found it implausible.238 
¶66 At the time, Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was a covert CIA operative.239  In an 
endeavor to discredit Wilson, White House officials—including Vice President Dick 
Cheney, his Chief of Staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby and Karl Rove—allegedly conspired 
to leak Plame’s name to the press,240 asserting that Plame’s status at the CIA allowed her 
                                                 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at *5.  Shaw’s knowledge that Klinkhamer was engaged in the impropriety of getting her campaign 
donors off the legal hook jeopardized her job as a public official.  Thus, Klinkhamer and Maholland likely 
conspired to fire Shaw to maintain their positions of state power. 
232 Id. at *6. 
233 Id. at *18-*19. 
234 Id. at *19 (emphasis added).  This perfectly illustrates the inequity of the “solely personal motive” 
exception.  See infra Part VI.B.2. 
235 Complaint, Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-1258). 
236 Joseph C. Wilson IV, Op-Ed., What I Didn’t Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, Section 4 (Week 
in Review), at 9. 
237 The rationale was that Saddam Hussein sought nuclear material from Africa.  George W. Bush, U.S. 
President, State of the Union Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 82 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html. 
238 Wilson, supra note 236. 
239 Patrick Fitzgerald, Press Conference, Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald On the Indictment of I. Lewis 
Libby (Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/osc/documents/2005_10_28_fitzgerald 
_press_conference.pdf [hereinafter “Fitzgerald Press Conference”].  While Plame was not undercover at the 
time, she had been in the past, and her employment with the CIA was classified.  Id. 
240 Complaint, supra note 235, ¶ 2.  Libby was eventually convicted on four counts of perjury and 
obstruction of justice for lying to a federal grand jury about his role in the leak.  Pierre Thomas, Jason Ryan 
& Theresa Cook, Libby Found Guilty on Four Counts, ABCNews.com, Mar. 6, 2007, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2899477&page=1.  Karl Rove was a source for a reporter who 
published Valerie Plame’s name.  Sydney Blumenthal, Libby’s Cynical Defense, Salon.com, Feb. 15, 2007, 
http://www.salon.com/opinion/blumenthal/2007/02/15/libby_trial/index.html.  Libby discussed Plame’s 
CIA employment with multiple reporters.  Id.  Though Cheney was not a source, investigators may probe 
further to determine the extent of his participation because Libby’s defense may be a cover story to shield 
Cheney.  See Murray Waas, The Libby-Cheney Connection, NAT’L JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 2007, 
http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/021907nj1.htm. 
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to arrange Wilson’s trip to Niger.241  However, by leaking her name, the officials abused 
knowledge they obtained as state actors and allegedly deprived Joseph Wilson and 
Valerie Plame [hereinafter, “the Wilsons”] of their rights. 
¶67 The Wilsons filed suit against Dick Cheney, Scooter Libby and Karl Rove, alleging 
that they violated the First Amendment by retaliating against Wilson242 and deprived 
Plame of her Fifth Amendment equal protection and property rights.243  The Wilsons 
further alleged that these individuals conspired under § 1985244 with an “invidiously 
discriminatory animus towards those who had publicly criticized the administration’s 
justifications for going to war with Iraq.”245  However, in an amended complaint, the 
Wilsons dropped this claim and proceeded instead with several direct Bivens claims 
under the First and Fifth Amendments.246 
¶68 On July 19, 2007, the Wilsons’ suit was dismissed.247  Since the Wilsons dropped 
their conspiracy claim, the court did not discuss the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.248  
However, this example is academically illuminating for a few reasons.  First, Cheney 
went to great lengths to discredit Wilson because he regarded Wilson’s op-ed as a 
personal attack since it implied that Cheney knew the alleged connection between Niger 
and Iraq was spurious.249  Cheney could not be held directly liable under § 1983 or 
Bivens because he took no action.  Cheney could be liable under a conspiracy theory, 
however, since he allegedly supported and devised the action.250  Second, this example 
illustrates how joining alleged conspirators can be beneficial for plaintiffs seeking 
extensive damages.251  As such, this case shows how an act ordered by a wealthy 
executive but carried out by his inferiors implicates a § 1983 conspiracy and the practical 
abuse of power.  It would be absurd to suggest that these men are incapable of conspiring 
                                                 
241 Fitzgerald Press Conference, supra note 239. 
242 Complaint, supra note 235, ¶¶ 41-44. 
243 Id. ¶¶ 45-49, 54-58. 
244 Id. ¶¶ 59-63. 
245 Id. ¶ 60. 
246 Amended Complaint, Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 06-1258).  The Wilsons 
likely dropped their conspiracy claim because the proposed class (those who publicly criticized the Bush 
administration’s rationales for war) would not qualify as protected.  See supra note 82 and accompanying 
text.  The Wilsons might have fared better by filing a § 1983 conspiracy claim since that section does not 
require intent to discriminate against a class and the Wilsons would only have needed to establish the 
deprivation and the existence of a conspiracy.  See supra note 76.  This would not be possible, however, 
since § 1983 claims cannot be brought against federal actors.  See Chavez v. U.S., 226 Fed. App’x 732, 734 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Wilsons did not allege a conspiracy claim under Bivens in the amended complaint.  
See Amended Complaint.
247 Wilson v. Libby, 498 F.Supp.2d 74, 99 (D.D.C 2007). 
248 Id. 
249 Toni Locy, Cheney May Be Called in CIA Leak Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/25/AR2006052500083.html.  Though 
Cheney himself leaked no information to the press, it is strongly alleged that he discussed this course of 
action with Libby since Cheney himself informed Libby of Plame’s CIA employment and marriage to 
Wilson.  Id. 
250 Thus, this case exemplifies the rationale for conspiracy liability under §§ 1983 and 1985: those who do 
not personally act to deprive people of rights, but who plan to do so through the acts of others, should be 
equally liable.  See supra notes 207-208 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra note 207.  Cheney obtained a $37 million dollar retirement package when he left Halliburton 
to run for Vice President.  Michael Kranish, Cheney Faces Decision on Wyoming Drilling, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 6, 2001, at A1. 
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simply because they all worked for the White House.252  While we may never know the 
truth about these events, it seems that in attempting to discredit their detractor, Cheney, 
Rove, and Libby conspired to abuse classified knowledge they obtained as federal actors 
to deprive the Wilsons of their rights.253 
B. The Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine is Inconsistent with the State of the Law 
in the Civil Rights Arena 
1. Torts and the Agency Relationship 
¶69 The veil-piercing notion of “looking through” the agency relationship to reach the 
facts becomes common sense when one recognizes that a claim of civil conspiracy “is 
essentially a tort action.”254  Those with state authority have a duty not to deprive others 
of their legal rights, as originally determined by the 1871 Act, now codified at §§ 1983 
and 1985.255  Victims of conspiracies under these sections must establish breach of that 
duty, an injury caused by the breach and damages.256  When viewed as a tort, the 
existence of an agency relationship is irrelevant because individuals are liable for their 
tortious actions, even if they were acting as agents.257  Thus, the “true basis of liability is 
the [agent’s breach of] duty owed to the third person” resulting in an injury to that 
person.258 
¶70 Proponents of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine argue that conspiracy is a 
special kind of tort in that it cannot be committed unless the defendants are “capable” of 
conspiring.  Intracorporate agents, they argue, are “incapable of conspiring” since any 
injurious act originated from a “single legal actor.”259 
                                                 
252 In fact, if anything, this employment relationship motivated the conspiracy because Wilson’s op-ed 
questioned the integrity of the White House and—though Libby and Rove were not named—of them and 
Cheney, specifically. 
253 A legal analyst (formerly Timothy McVeigh’s trial lawyer) who covered Libby’s criminal trial 
suggested that the evidence supported a finding that Cheney and Libby conspired to leak classified 
information.  Jeralyn Merritt, Libby Trial: Missing the Forest for the Trees, Huffingtonpost.com, Feb. 1, 
2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeralyn-merritt/libby-trial-missing-the_b_41734.html. 
254 County Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159,174 (3d Cir. 2006). 
255 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra note 61 for the requisite elements to state a section 1985 claim.  The first three elements 
establish the breach of duty, while the fourth lists two possible injuries that give rise to damages.  See supra 
note 76 for the necessary elements to state a section 1983 claim.  Here, the first element is the breach of 
duty and the second is the injury that gives rise to damages. 
257 FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 1135 (explaining that “[t]his rule applies to torts committed by those acting 
in their official capacities as officers or agents of a corporation” (citing Odell v. Signer, 169 So. 2d 851, 
854 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1964))).  The agents of a corporation are “personally liable to any third person they 
injured by virtue of their tortious activity even if such acts were performed within the scope of their 
employment as corporate officers.”  Id. 
258 Id.; see also id. § 1160 (noting “[a] person cannot escape personal liability for malicious prosecution 
merely because he or she acted as an officer of a corporation and not as an individual”). 
259 See, e.g., Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th Cir. 2000).  This proposition, 
more than any other, I believe, has fueled the widespread acceptance of the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine in the civil rights field due to its elementary reasoning.  Unfortunately, its assertion is pure 
misdirection.  Indeed, the single-corporate-entity-cannot-conspire-with-itself argument as applied in 
intracorporate immunity cases arose with the doctrine itself in Nelson Radio, where the court, considering 
whether a corporation could conspire with itself when no officers or agents were named as defendants, 
noted that a corporation cannot do so “any more than a private individual can.”  Nelson Radio & Supply 
Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952).  That a corporation cannot conspire with itself is 
but a truism, though not for the reason stated in Nelson Radio (and repeated ad nauseam ever since).  While 
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¶71 This argument has yet to receive the scrutiny it deserves.  Civil conspiracy is 
defined as (1) an agreement by multiple persons (2) to jointly (3) accomplish some 
unlawful purpose.260  Agents of municipal entities are capable of conspiring since they, 
like any other group of human beings, can agree to mutually attain an unlawful purpose, 
i.e., the deprivation of another person’s legal rights.  All three elements of a civil 
conspiracy are fulfilled.  The difficulty arises in the fact that carrying out the unlawful 
purpose requires the conspirators to act in their official capacity as agents of the state.  In 
doing so, their actions are attributed to the single municipal entity. 
¶72 Among the elements necessary to state a claim of conspiracy under §§ 1983 and 
1985 are the (1) existence of a conspiracy among the defendants and (2) an action taken 
in furtherance of that conspiracy resulting in a deprived right.261  Most courts hold that 
the first element fails when intracorporate conspiracies are alleged.262  This may be due, 
in part, to the fact that courts use unnecessarily broad language when applying the 
doctrine.263 
¶73 However, the conspiracy element does not fail on account of impossibility.264  
Instead, it is the act depriving the plaintiff of a right—the second element—that fails, 
because, according to the doctrine, the act is attributed to the state entity and not the 
alleged conspirators.  The plaintiff, therefore, cannot show that the alleged conspirators 
performed an act furthering the object of the conspiracy because the single state actor is 
the only “person” who acted.  While the state’s act furthered the conspiracy, the state 
itself was not a conspirator; thus neither the state nor the conspirators—lacking the first 
and second elements, respectively—may be held liable. 
¶74 Despite the “single actor,” however, when the municipal corporate action results in 
a deprivation of rights, Congress intended the 1871 Act to permit recovery.  Therefore, 
the agency relationship is irrelevant when the plaintiff can establish the civil rights 
                                                                                                                                                 
it is true that a single entity cannot conspire alone, no entity can conspire without a brain that allows it to 
think and act independently because conspiracies require “a meeting of the minds.”  Ameen v. Merck & 
Co., 226 Fed. App’x 363, 371 (5th Cir. 2007).  Thus, a corporation cannot conspire because it has no 
independent will capable of agreeing to an illicit goal.  It would therefore be equally proper to assert that a 
“corporation cannot conspire with itself any more than a” rock can.  Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d at 914. 
This conclusion is not dictated by the first premise of corporate personality, that a corporation is a 
single legal entity apart from its constituents, but by the second premise, that a corporation is an artificial 
person without an independent will.  See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.  In contrast, 
intracorporate agents have independent wills because they are human beings.  Thus, they are and always 
have been capable of conspiring.  See infra note 263.  That intracorporate agents now enjoy virtual 
immunity to conspiracy charges is partly due to the shortsightedness of plaintiffs lawyers.  See infra note 
270. 
260 Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1999). 
261See supra notes 61 and 76 for the elements necessary to state a claim under sections 1985 and 1983, 
respectively. 
262 See, e.g., Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 768. 
263 In the civil rights context, courts appear to interpret or regard the corporate entity too broadly, so as to 
include every act of each one of its agents, contrary to agency principles.  For example, in one case in the 
Fourth Circuit, the court wrote: “Because the defendants are all agents of [the defendant medical school], 
they constitute a single legal entity.  They are thus legally incapable of conspiracy.”  Lewin v. Cooke, 28 
Fed. App’x 186, 195 (4th Cir. 2002); accord Chambliss v. Foote, 421 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. La. 1976).  This 
holding is overbroad and does not accurately reflect the doctrine because the agents do not constitute a 
single entity; rather, their acts are attributed to a single entity.  Furthermore, the agents are capable of 
conspiracy, for if they conspired purely as individuals outside the scope of employment or with a third 
party, the conspiracy is actionable.  FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 4884. 
264 See supra note 263. 
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conspiracy due to the defendants’ breach of their duty not to deprive others of their rights.  
This notion is supported by Rebel Van Lines v. Compton, which noted that applying “the 
intra-corporate conspiracy [doctrine] to public entities and officials would immunize 
official policies of discrimination.  This result would contravene the law as it now 
exists.”265 
¶75 Permitting recovery would have broad implications if not for the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services.266  There, the Court held that “a 
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”267  It may be 
held liable, however, “when execution of a [state] policy or custom, [set by] those whose 
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . . under  
§ 1983.”268  Absent a showing of official policy, only the conspirators may be held 
liable.269  As such, the scope of this article is limited to the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine’s effect of barring claims against individual conspirators and not against their 
principal municipal corporate entities.270 
2. Analyzing Exceptions to the Doctrine 
¶76 The nature and number of exceptions to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 
demonstrate that, in the civil rights field, its reach is overbroad.  The Dombrowski 
                                                 
265 663 F. Supp. 786, 793-94 (C.D. Cal. 1987).  This statement was made before the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine was a widely accepted defense to conspiracy claims against municipal agents.  In cases 
before 1980, the doctrine is never mentioned when agents were held liable.  See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 
F.2d 110, 124-26 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding, with no discussion of the intracorporate exception, that the 
plaintiff’s § 1983 conspiracy claim should, at trial, be submitted to the jury where two white plaintiffs sued 
three police officers for denying their First Amendment right to “associate with Negroes in a public 
restaurant”); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming a jury’s finding that the chief 
of police and his assistant conspired to deprive the plaintiff of his right to free speech); see also Lenzer v. 
Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 511-12 (1992) (refusing to apply the intracorporate exception to civil 
conspiracy cases where an employee sued under § 1983 claiming several state agents terminated her 
employment and deprived her of free speech rights after she reported patient abuse at the defendants’ 
rehabilitation center); Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992-94 (7th Cir. 1988); Bell v. City of 
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1253-64 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Russ v. Watts, 414 
F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). 
266 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
267 Id. at 691 (continuing: “in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a 
respondeat superior theory”). 
268 Id. at 694. 
269 The municipality would not be liable in civil rights conspiracy cases as it could not be alleged as a 
conspirator.  See supra note 259.  This would not, however, preclude the municipality from indemnifying 
the conspirators for their actions. 
270 Given the holding of Monell, it seems municipal corporations will rarely be liable for conspiratorial 
rights deprivations because the motives for such actions cannot be attributed to official policy.  By the same 
token, private corporations would rarely be liable, not only because they cannot execute state action, but 
because the corporate principal (i.e., the board of directors) would likely never authorize conspiratorial 
deprivations.  Without authorization, the corporate principal is not liable.  See supra note 212.  It is clear 
that plaintiffs’ lawyers sued the principal corporations in civil rights conspiracy cases to reach the deep 
pockets of those entities.  However, given the statements above, this course of action was likely more 
harmful than helpful.  By including corporations as defendants, these lawyers only reinforced the idea that 
a corporation and its agents cannot conspire.  However, I believe civil rights conspiracy plaintiffs should be 
allowed to recover under §§ 1983 and 1985 if they do not sue the principal entity and instead sue only the 
individual conspirators in both their individual and official capacities.  This method of suing defendants is 
proper because the act of conspiring implicates the former capacity while the act furthering the object of the 
conspiracy implicates the latter.  See infra Part VI.C. 
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decision was correct because the plaintiff alleged that one agent conspired with his 
corporate principal.271  However, the rule does not accord with Congress’s intent when 
there are multiple human conspirators.  Though the conspirators acted as agents of one 
entity, they agreed to a course of action which deprived another person of her legal rights; 
the fact that the conspirators accomplished the deprivation through an official action by a 
non-human entity should not negate their liability.272 
¶77 One exception is particularly useless given that §§ 1983 and 1985 are generally 
violated by state actors.  The Dombrowski court obliquely qualified its dicta on the 
doctrine, suggesting that, if the Klan were to incorporate, its agents “could not carry out 
acts of violence with impunity simply because they were acting under orders from the 
Grand Dragon.”273  Courts construed this to mean “conspirators may not create a 
principal for whom they are agents in order to make their acts all the acts of a single legal 
person that cannot be charged with conspiring with itself.”274  This exception benefits no 
one, since state actors never create the municipal entities through which they act.275  
While the defendants in Dickerson and Shaw did not create the state entity through which 
they deprived the plaintiffs of constitutional rights, they utilized the entity to shield 
themselves from liability for their wrongful acts.  In this way, conspirators are using their 
state authority to divest individuals of their constitutional rights “with impunity.”276 
                                                 
271 Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 192 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972).  This is how I believe the doctrine 
should work: in such cases, there is truly one legal actor, not because the agent and principal are the same 
actor, but because a conspiracy requires a “meeting of the minds,” Ameen v. Merck & Co., 226 Fed. App’x 
363, 371 (2007), and corporate entities have no mind.  See supra note 259.  The First and Third Circuits 
apply the doctrine correctly by denying claims against a single corporate entity or an agent and his 
corporate principal.  Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 663 F.2d 336, 338 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(holding a § 1985 conspiracy claim fails where the plaintiff sued only a single corporate entity and “named 
no individual faculty members as defendants”); Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 430 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (holding a § 1985 conspiracy claim fails because “a corporation cannot conspire with its 
president”).  These circuits allow conspiracy claims, however, when the individual conspirators are named 
as defendants.  Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1984); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1978).  Thus, the First and Third Circuits correctly apply the 
principles of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to the civil rights context whereas the majority of 
circuits refuse to allow claims against individual defendants who conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their 
civil rights.  It is only fair to note that the lawyers in these cases may be equally at fault where they failed to 
join or retain the alleged individual conspirators as defendants. 
272 In contrast, the doctrine is appropriate in antitrust law because “the evil at which the ‘conspiracy’ 
section of the Sherman Act is aimed is an evil that exists only when two different business enterprises join 
to make a decision, such as fixing a price, that in a competitive world each would” make on its own.  
Stathos, 728 F.2d at 21.  Further, when such a price-fixing decision is made by a single enterprise, the 
decision “is not only legitimately socially useful but also may often require joint decision-making by 
managers within” that single enterprise.  Id.  The Stathos court contested the doctrine’s applicability in the 
civil rights context by noting that “one cannot readily distinguish in terms of harm between the individual 
conduct of one enterprise and the joint conduct of several, [nor] can one readily identify desirable social 
conduct as typically engaged in jointly by the officers of a single enterprise.”  Id; see also O.H. v. Oakland 
Unified Sch. Dist., No. C-99-5123, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21725, at *10-*27 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2000). 
273 Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196. 
274 Cole v. Univ. of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 893 (D. Conn. 1975). 
275 I have been unable to find a single case in which a court applied this exception to hold defendants liable, 
which demonstrates the exception’s utter uselessness.  The only reason for discussing this exception is to 
show the scant reasoning courts employ when deciding issues that involve corporate entities and 
conspiracies.  See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text. 
276 Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196; see supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
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¶78 Moreover, the police misconduct exception—whereby police officers are held 
liable for conspiring because their acts are clearly outside the scope of employment277—
is myopic.  Non-police government employees abuse power and engage in the same type 
of bad behavior as police officers.  The only difference is that police misconduct is 
salient, highly visible to ordinary people, and clearly outside the scope of employment, 
while the misconduct of government agents and officials is inconspicuous and difficult to 
trace.278 
¶79 Furthermore, the exception based on a series of actions or continuing instances of 
discrimination279 demonstrates the logical fallacy of the doctrine.  The exception 
disavows the notion that corporate agents are incapable of conspiring where courts find 
ample evidence of a conspiracy through multiple acts.280  Thus, the exception holds that 
corporate agents can conspire, and intimates that, in other cases, there is simply not 
sufficient evidence of a conspiracy. 
¶80 Finally, the “solely personal stake/motive”281 standard is inequitable and 
inconsistent with the intent of the 1871 Act and other civil rights jurisprudence.282  The 
standard does not take into account the fact that the majority of injuries leading to viable 
conspiracy claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 are perpetrated by those cloaked in state 
power.283  Conspiracies alleged under these sections tend to injure the powerless, so 
requiring plaintiffs to show that the action was accomplished without a single official 
reason would negate claims Congress intended to permit.284  In addition, this standard is 
inconsistent with other civil rights cases.  In discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has 
held that plaintiffs only need show that an improper purpose was a “motivating” or a 
“substantial” factor in the decision.285  As such, discriminatory acts taken in an official 
capacity should be viewed as outside the scope of employment if personal motives played 
a motivating or substantial role in the decision leading to the injurious act.286  Thus, 
                                                 
277 See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text. 
278 For example, the conspiracies alleged in Shaw, supra Part VI.A.2.b, where the mayor and her aide 
conspired to fire the chief of police to prevent him from publicizing the mayor’s impropriety, and in Wilson 
v. Libby, supra Part VI.A.3, where White House officials allegedly conspired to deprive their detractors of 
their legal rights, are outside the scope of employment, but difficult to uncover. 
279 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
280 See, e.g., Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1984). 
281 See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text. 
282 One commentator asserts that this exception is useless because government agents are liable for their 
unlawful actions regardless of motive.  Finch, supra note 190, at 46. 
283 See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
284 Klan members who held state office (and today, state agents who engage in conspiracies to deprive 
others of rights) would undoubtedly be able to assert an official reason for the deprivation, even if the 
reason is mere pretext.  For example, the defendants in Shaw, supra Part VI.A.2.b, might assert that Shaw, 
the chief of police, was fired because his job performance had been slipping.  They might even find a few 
pieces of evidence to support this contention well after he was fired.  Nevertheless, his firing would not be 
justified in this manner after the fact if the real reason for his termination was due to his speaking out 
against the mayor’s acts of political impropriety. 
285 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Sch. 
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), superseded by statute on other grounds, Rivera v. 
United States, 924 F.2d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1991).  In a law to protect whistleblowers such as Shaw, supra 
Part VI.A.2.b, from employment discrimination, Congress chose a “contributing factor” standard.  5 U.S.C. 
§ 1221(e)(1) (2000). 
286 Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that where the defendants acted “to 
further their personal bias,” or, in other words, for substantially personal reasons, they acted “outside the 
scope of their employment” and were thus liable); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 
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rather than the broad holding that agents of a single entity cannot conspire to deprive 
people of their civil rights, courts should adopt this standard, which jibes with the wishes 
of Congress and by which §§ 1983 and 1985 conspiracies may be remedied equitably. 
C. A Standard in Accordance with the Congressional Purpose 
¶81 I argue that the determination of whether a conspiracy existed should draw upon 
the motive of the act furthering the conspiracy.287  It is not always clear whether the 
motive for the act was possessed by the principal or the alleged conspirators.  If the 
principal had a legitimate motive, it is likely no conspiracy existed.  If, however, the state 
actors had a substantial, discriminatory motive288 for the official action while the 
principal had no motive, then both parties should be afforded an opportunity to present 
their evidence.  Thus, courts should employ a burden-shifting framework in deciding 
whether the plaintiff proved the existence of the conspiracy.  Further, courts should 
consider granting qualified immunity to the state actors. 
1. The Motive of the Injurious Act is Determinative 
¶82 The question should not be whether the decision was made solely for personal 
reasons, but whether personal reasons played a substantial role in the final 
determination.289  The latter standard is consistent with the intent of Congress.  The 
former would bar, for example, Dickerson’s claim, due to the principal’s motive to hold 
someone accountable for the escape.  While this motive is legitimate, it would be unjust 
to hold Dickerson and his subordinates responsible for the escape when they played no 
part in it.  Thus, if personal reasons played a substantial role in the decision that caused 
the plaintiffs’ injuries, the act—while executed in an official capacity—was undertaken 
for a dubious official reason.  As such, the lack of a legitimate official reason must mean 
the act was outside the scope of employment.290  Even though the defendant acted while 
wearing her “official hat,” her decision to act was made while wearing her “individual 
hat.”291  Therefore, plaintiffs should recover if they show that a “discriminatory purpose 
was a motivating [or, in other words, a substantial] factor” in the injurious decision.292  
                                                                                                                                                 
(conduct is outside the scope of employment when it is “too little actuated by a purpose to serve the 
master”). 
287 While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine’s proponents argue this act is a single act of the 
corporation, it must be remembered “that the metaphysical entity has no thought or will of its own [and] 
that every act ascribed to it[] emanates from and is the act of the individuals personated by it.”  State ex rel. 
Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 184 (1892). 
288 In this sense, the term “discriminatory” does not relate specifically to claims under § 1985 in which an 
invidiously discriminatory animus is necessary.  Rather, it is used more generally to denote a personal 
animus towards the plaintiff, such as one that would motivate a state actor to abuse his power to deprive the 
plaintiff of rights actionable under §§ 1983 or 1985. 
289 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
290 See supra note 286. 
291 Cole v. Univ. of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 893 (D. Conn. 1975). 
292 See supra note 285 and accompanying text.  Given that in other contexts, courts have never required a 
discrimination plaintiff to show that her injuries were caused solely by personal motives, it is interesting to 
note the difference between the standards of Nelson Radio and Hartman.  The Nelson Radio court implied 
that any personal motive might negate the doctrine.  Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 
F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952).  In contrast, the Hartman court held that the doctrine is only negated when 
the act was prompted solely by personal motives.  Hartman v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 4 
F.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1993).  The Nelson Radio court reasoned that if the conspirators acted to further 
 162
Vol. 3:1] Barry Horwitz 
This standard is optimal because when an improper purpose is a substantial factor in the 
action, applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to agents of state entities 
empowers them to jointly abuse their authority. 
¶83 In Garza v. City of Omaha, the Eighth Circuit found an exception to the doctrine 
when the individual defendants are named and are alleged to have acted “outside the 
scope of their employment for personal reasons.”293  The Eighth Circuit held the § 1985 
claim actionable based on evidence that the defendants “were acting to further their 
personal bias.”294  While “furthering personal bias” would be an overly broad rule 
because many state actions arguably could fulfill this purpose, the “substantial factor” 
test is consistent with Congress’s intent when applied correctly.  One court framed the 
standard by applying the personal motive exception “where the conspirator gained a 
direct personal benefit . . . wholly separable from” the entity’s benefit.295  This standard 
accords with Congress’s intent because the motive for the act determines whether a 
conspiracy existed.296 
                                                                                                                                                 
their own purposes, the act could not be attributed directly to the corporate entity.  Nelson Radio, 200 F.2d 
at 914.  However, by the time of Hartman, § 1985 required plaintiffs to establish a personal motive in the 
form of an “invidiously discriminatory animus.”  Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).  Thus, 
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is unsuitably broad in the civil rights arena because a significant 
exception to the doctrine in its original (antitrust) field is a requirement under § 1985.  The Hartman court 
was forced to revise the exception in order to save an ill-suited rule.  The revision, however, limits the 
section’s reach by denying recovery where Congress intended it. 
The Hartman court supported its “solely personal reasons” standard by citing Fletcher’s Law of 
Corporations § 4877.  Hartman, 4 F.3d at 470.  This section, however, does not govern the liabilities of 
agents; it regulates the liability of the corporation itself.  FLETCHER, supra note 20, § 4877.  Further, 
Fletcher’s language in a later section contradicts the holding of Hartman explicitly, noting that no 
conspiracy exists when agents “are acting solely for the corporation.”  Id. § 4884.  In other words, agents 
may be held liable when their acts are motivated by anything other than the welfare of the corporation.  
This interpretation is further cemented when Fletcher notes that agents “will not be held personally liable 
[where they acted] on behalf of the corporation and maintained no independent personal stakes in the 
object of the conspiracy.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, a conspirator can be held personally liable if he has 
any independent personal stake in the conspiracy’s unlawful objective.  This position accords with a 
substantial number of precedents, including Greenville Publishing, Nelson Radio, and Garza v. City of 
Omaha.  See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text; Garza v. City of Omaha, 814 F.2d 553, 556 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
293 Garza, 814 F.2d at 556. 
294 Id. 
295 Selman v. Am. Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225, 239 (W.D. Va. 1988). 
296 For Title VII employment discrimination, Congress and the Supreme Court settled on but-for causation 
to determine whether a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages.  See Russell D. Covey, The 
Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 
290-94 (2007) (explaining how Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overturn a Supreme Court 
holding that but-for causation is necessary for plaintiffs to recover and that Congress limited recovery to 
declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and costs when but-for causation is not established).  
However, there are several reasons courts should not require the heightened standard of the but-for test and 
instead should apply the substantial factor test to decide whether a conspiracy existed (and thus, whether a 
conspiracy plaintiff may recover compensatory damages).  First, the rights in conspiracy cases are 
generally constitutional rather than statutory and, as such, courts should vindicate these rights whenever 
possible.  Mark Neal Aaronson, Ideas Matter: A Review of John Denvir’s Democracy’s Constitution, 36 
U.S.F. L. REV. 937, 953 (2002) (noting that “constitutional rights are due greater deference than statutory 
rights”).  Second, the substantial factor test will protect plaintiffs’ rights better than the but-for test because 
it would allow recovery whenever discriminatory motives improperly contributed to the deprivation.  In 
contrast, applying the but-for test to decide whether an improper personal motive caused an allegedly 
conspiratorial deprivation would be akin to endorsing the “solely personal motive” standard, because for 
both standards, the plaintiff can recover only when the state actors have a clear personal motive that 
saliently influences state action.  Thus, the but-for test suffers the same flaw as the “solely personal motive” 
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¶84 To be clear, I am not advocating a total rejection of the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine in the civil rights arena.  In cases where it is alleged that one agent conspired 
with his municipal corporate principal, the doctrine should apply.297  The doctrine should 
also bar liability “for routine, collaborative business decisions that are later alleged to be 
discriminatory”298 since there is no legal injury where no discrimination existed.  This, 
however, requires a determination of whether the action was in fact discriminatory. 
2. Limits on the Proposed Scheme: A Burden-Shifting Framework and Qualified 
Immunity 
¶85 Under the proposed standard, courts should determine the motive behind the act 
furthering the conspiracy.  Since conspiracies are, by definition, undertaken for 
illegitimate purposes, a legitimate and nondiscriminatory motive will prove that no 
conspiracy existed.  Our society is keen to seek out and uncover conspiracies, but perhaps 
too keen: human nature leads some to believe that conspiracies exist when there are far 
simpler answers.299  When alleged conspirators can readily articulate valid and justifiable 
reasons for the action giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury, it must be assumed that the 
conspiracy exists only in the mind of the plaintiff.  As such, there is truly no legal injury.  
The question, then, is how one determines the legitimacy of an injurious action. 
¶86 The answer is a tool used in similar discrimination cases to determine the 
legitimacy of an employer’s adverse actions: the McDonnell Douglas framework.  While 
the framework was originally developed in the context of Title VII, courts have applied it 
to Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation, including the 1871 Act.300 
¶87 To begin, the plaintiff must prove “by the preponderance of the evidence a prima 
facie case of discrimination.”301  Then, the defendant must assert a “legitimate, 
                                                                                                                                                 
standard: it is inequitable because the state agents can almost always assert a pretext for the deprivation.  
See supra notes 233-234, 281-286 and 289-290 and accompanying text.  Third, conspiracy liability is a 
useful tool to fight the “special evil” of conspiracies.  See supra note 208 and accompanying text.  Thus, to 
deter state actors from jointly abusing power, conspiracy liability should be enforced when improper 
motives substantially caused a deprivation of rights.  Fourth, while the Third Restatement of Torts 
abandoned the substantial factor test, this was done for the purpose of determining act causation (whether 
an act caused an injury).  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC 
PRINCIPLES) 26 cmt. j (tentative draft no. 2, 2002).  For civil rights conspiracies, the test would be used to 
determine motive causation (whether a motive caused an act).  Given that the majority of civil rights 
conspiracy claims involve employment discrimination, see, e.g., cases cited supra note 22, the substantial 
factor test is better suited to that field of law, “in which actor’s motives are paramount in determining 
liability.”  See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 148 
(2006).  Finally, the test will prevent insubstantial motives from giving rise to liability, and there will be no 
potential for jury confusion because the decision will be a question of law. 
297 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra note 106. 
299 See Ted Goertzel, Belief in Conspiracy Theories, 15 POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 731, 739 (1994) (noting 
that believing in conspiracies provides people with “a tangible enemy to blame for problems which 
otherwise seem too abstract” and that conspiracies “provide ready answers for unanswered questions and 
help to resolve contradictions”).  Interestingly, the study on which the paper was based found a tendency to 
believe in conspiracies “more common among black and [Hispanic] respondents than among white 
respondents.”  Id. 
300 Reese v. City of Southfield, No. 97-1670, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20527, at *11 (6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1998) 
(noting that the Supreme Court applied the framework to a § 1981 claim and that courts in several circuits 
have applied it to § 1983 claims). 
301 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). 
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nondiscriminatory reason for” the allegedly unconstitutional deprivation.302  Finally, the 
plaintiff is given the “opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
. . . reasons offered by the defendant” are mere pretexts.303 
¶88 With this framework extended to § 1983 conspiracy claims, the plaintiff would 
establish her own case and the defendant’s personal motive.  Similarly, in § 1985 claims, 
the plaintiff must establish an invidiously discriminatory animus.304  For both, plaintiffs 
must prove the act was illegitimately discriminatory, meaning it was substantially 
prompted by personal motives. 
¶89 With this framework in place, plaintiffs like Dickerson and Shaw would have a fair 
chance to recover for the deprivation of their rights.  Dickerson could have proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was demoted to protect the integrity of the white 
officers truly responsible for the prisoner’s escape.305  Shaw could have proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was fired for exercising his First Amendment right 
to speak out against the mayor’s acts of favoritism, which illegitimately obstructed 
justice.306  In countless other cases, plaintiffs would be given the chance to establish a 
conspiracy-fueled rights deprivation without having their claim virtually disqualified 
before it is filed.  Only after hearing both sides of the issue and determining the 
legitimacy of an action should a court rule on the applicability of the intracorporate 
conspiracy doctrine.  Even then, courts may negate a defendant’s liability, if appropriate, 
through qualified immunity.307 
                                                 
302 Id. at 253. 
303 Id. 
304 See Finch, supra, note 190, at 46 (noting that because § 1985(3) requires an invidious discriminatory 
animus, it “bespeaks a personal motive”).  By definition, this standard requires establishing that the 
defendants acted so intolerably and deplorably that the discrimination is self-evident. 
305 See Dickerson v. Alachua County Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761, 764 (11th Cir. 2000). 
306 See Shaw v. Klinkhamer, No. 03-6748, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14483, at *18-*19 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 
2005). 
307 Qualified immunity should be applied on a case-by-case basis to conspiracy claims under §§ 1983 and 
1985.  Under this doctrine, public officials are immune from liability if “the state of the law [at the time did 
not give them] fair warning that their [treatment of the plaintiff] was unconstitutional.”  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 
U.S. 730, 741 (2002).  Since depriving others of their constitutional rights is obviously unconstitutional, 
qualified immunity should still be extended if its underlying rationales would be furthered: 
(1) the injustice . . . of subjecting to liability an officer who is required . . . to exercise discretion; 
(2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office 
with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good; [and (3)] the fear that the 
threat of personal liability might deter citizens from holding public office. 
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980).  The existence of a conspiracy and, thus, 
the legitimacy of an injurious action, should be threshold issues to reaching the question of qualified 
immunity.  While the existence of qualified immunity should generally be resolved early in a lawsuit, 
resolution of such a claim must await a full trial where there are disputed issues of material fact—in this 
case, whether a conspiracy existed.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001); Mitchell v. Randolph, 
215 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2000).  Therefore, if an action is adjudged to be illegitimate and injurious, the 
first rationale for qualified immunity does not apply because the actor willingly engaged in a conspiracy, 
negating any claim of merely exercising discretion.  The second and third rationales, however, are 
reasonable considerations that should be balanced against the facts of the case.  If the act is entirely 
illegitimate, qualified immunity should not apply since the rationales are not implicated.  Citizens would 
not be deterred from holding public office or executing such office with decisiveness by a denial of 
qualified immunity where the facts surrounding the denial portrayed an illegitimate and unjust conspiracy.  
If, however, the act was arguably legitimate, and imposing liability may threaten the willingness of citizens 
(1) to work in public office or (2) to execute their office with decisiveness, a court should extend immunity.  
In making this determination, courts should consider how the public might view the act and resolve doubts 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
¶90 The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should not negate civil rights conspiracy 
liability against individual defendants where plaintiffs can establish a conspiratorial 
deprivation of their rights that was substantially driven by a personal motive.  The 
substantial factor test and the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework—both of 
which are already used in employment discrimination cases—will serve the purpose of 
aiding courts in determining whether the acts alleged were, in fact, precipitated by a 
conspiracy.  In cases where a conspiracy existed, courts should disregard the artificial 
municipal entity to reach the facts because applying the intracorporate conspiracy 
doctrine to immunize state agents who would deprive others of their rights is contrary to 
the intent of the 1871 Act and age-old civil rights conspiracy law.  In passing the 1871 
Act, Congress provided remedial measures for those conspiracies that it believed violated 
public policy.  The artificial corporate entity must not be used to sanction violations of 
that policy. 
¶91 When the courts first created the piercing the corporate veil doctrine, it was 
understood that the artificial entity was a tool not to be abused.  Sadly, decades of 
jurisprudence have deserted this conception to the benefit of government agents and to 
the detriment of individuals.  While the Constitution set forth the principles by which our 
government functions, our true founding principles are manifest in the Bill of Rights and 
the Declaration of Independence, where the sanctity of individual dignity pervades.  The 
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine’s application in the civil rights arena subverts this 
dignity.  Thus, courts should recognize that the need to rectify unjust conspiracies that 
deprive individuals of their rights is far more important than protecting state actors from 
liability for joint wrongs realized through the abuse of their state power. 
                                                                                                                                                 
in favor of granting immunity. 
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